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FORTHCOMING COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, OCTOBER 2021 
 
OBSOLESCENCE: THE INTRACTABLE PRODUCTION PROBLEM IN 
CONTRACT LAW 
Alan Schwartz∗ and Robert E. Scott∗∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Contract law has long suffered from an institutional problem: Which 
legal institution can best create an ef�icient law for commercial contracts that 
can overcome "obsolescence”—the persistence of rules that only solve 
yesterday’s contracting problems? Until the early 20th century, contract law 
was largely created by common law courts. The law's default rules were 
ef�icient when created and courts updated them as commerce changed. But 
there were few rules and the common law process is slow. In response, the 20th 
century saw public and private lawmaking bodies enact commercial statutes 
in discrete legal areas such as secured credit, commercial paper and 
bankruptcy. Cohesive interest groups rapidly updated these discrete rules, but 
the rules, both originally and as changed, served only the interests of the 
creating groups. Private lawmaking efforts also assumed a generalist 
portfolio. In the Uniform Commercial Code, they reached beyond specialized 
�ields to the law of sales and then, in the Restatements, to all contracting 
behavior. But these generalist bodies lack the institutional capacity to update, 
so many of their rules have not changed with changing commercial practice.  
Obsolescence is not innocuous: it can induce inef�icient contracting practices 
and encourage parties to behave strategically. The need for a modern general 
law of commercial contracts remains. Specialized lawmakers are subject to 
interest group capture and the generalist lawmaking bodies cannot update. 
Courts have responded better to the obsolescence concern, but they are slow 
and limited. Hence we suggest a public/private regulatory response to the 
vexing production problem in contract law. 
 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................... 1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Contract law has a production problem. Commercial parties require a 
contract law that is both efficient when it is created and that also adapts 
efficiently when commercial circumstances change. But currently no legal 
institution exists that can satisfy both of these criteria. Three legal 
institutions produce commercial contract law today: courts, statutes that 
regulate discrete areas, and private lawmaking bodies that create general 
contract law rules.1 As we will show, each has limitations. Common law 
courts develop default rules that are ef�icient when they are created and are 
updated as economic conditions change. But law making through the 
judicial process only produces a restricted set of general contract law rules 
and updating is slow: These constraints re�lect the limited capacity of courts 
to address more particular commercial practices adequately. In response, 
                                                                                                                                                    
 1. The American Law Institute (ALI) and the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) (also 
known as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) are the private 
legislative bodies that create general commercial contract law. The ALI and ULC jointly 
created the law of sales in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and the ALI created 
the two contracts Restatements. 
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both public and private lawmaking institutions have created specialized 
statutes that specify rules for discrete legal areas such as secured debt, 
commercial paper, �inancial transactions, and bankruptcy.2 These 
specialized statutes are useful complements to the general law of contracts. 
Yet, the rules were enacted at the instance of cohesive interest groups: The 
public interest was poorly represented in the enactment process. The felt 
need for more and better rules governing the general law of contracts led 
the private lawmaking groups to produce the law of sales in Article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and the two Restatements of Contracts. 
These private lawmaking efforts developed new default rules that covered 
a wider range of contract law issues than the common law, but history has 
shown that the rules do not adapt to changing circumstances. 
The source of the dif�iculties that plague the commercial law 
production process is the singular fact of obsolescence. A commercial law 
rule, whether a default rule or a mandatory rule, is obsolete when it is no 
longer “apt.” An apt rule ef�iciently solves a “contracting problem” in the 
current state of the world, and also solves the problem in future states of 
the world that are “relevantly similar” to the current state.3 But if in a future 
state the contracting problem takes a different form, the apt solution to the 
problem can change as well. An obsolescence concern exists, therefore, 
when a legal rule becomes inapt: That is, the rule does not solve the 
contracting problem in its current form.4 
                                                                                                                                                    
 2. The ALI and ULC have jointly created a number of specialized commercial statutes 
that are incorporated into the UCC, including Article 9 (secured credit), Article 3 (negotiable 
instruments), Article 4 (bank deposits and collection), and Article 5 (letters of credit). Prior 
to the UCC project, the ULC produced several predecessor statutes, including the Trust 
Receipts Act and the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL) that were adopted by many state 
legislatures. Congress, on the other hand, is responsible for the various Bankruptcy Acts, 
including the most recent regulation of business bankruptcies, the Bankruptcy Code of 1978. 
In addition, administrative regulators, acting under Congressional statutory authority, 
impose contractual requirements in the banking and �inancial regulatory context. An example 
is the Federal Reserve Board regulation of Systemically Important Financial Market Utilities, 
which impose standardization requirements for derivatives contracting. Regulatory 
standardization of derivatives contracts was a major factor in mitigating the 2008 �inancial 
crisis. See infra note 219 and accompanying text; see also e.g., Part VI for a discussion of the 
increasing role of administrative regulation of contract terms. 
 3. A contracting problem is an obstacle to the creation of a surplus maximizing 
contract. As examples, parties may want to create an incentive for the seller to invest 
ef�iciently in increasing the value of the traded product for the buyer; or, in a long-term 
contract, to ensure that neither party defects prematurely to an outside option. 
 4. The UCC Article 2 warranty provisions illustrate the obsolescence problem. Article 
2 primarily regulates quality issues with the implied warranty of merchantability: Goods must 
be “�it for the ordinary purposes for which they are used” or “pass without objection in the 
trade.” U.C.C § 2–314(2) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1952). This regulation was once 
ef�icient when sellers traded homogenous standard goods to large numbers of similarly 
situated buyers. However, the warranty is commonly disclaimed today because many sellers 
trade heterogenous—that is, customized—goods to buyers with particular needs. The UCC 
solution thus is no longer “apt.” Because the UCC is a statute, however, it necessarily continues 
to supply the original solution until it is amended. Though the UCC solution does not �it very 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3788595
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Obsolescence is a signi�icant concern because the commercial world of 
today is dissimilar in signi�icant ways from the world that existed when our 
leading commercial laws were created.5 UCC Article 2 took its current form 
by 1952, and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts was largely completed 
by 1974. Neither body of law has been materially amended since then.6 The 
obsolescence concern is also present in discrete legal areas like bankruptcy 
that enact speci�ic statutory solutions. The reorganization chapters of the 
Bankruptcy Code were last comprehensively redone in 1978. But today 
many insolvent �irms are directly sold to the market through an ill-de�ined 
process rather than reorganized under the Code’s elaborate rules.7 
                                                                                                                                                    
many parties’ contracting problem of how best to allocate between them the risk that the 
goods will be nonconforming, parties still face these quality issues and the need for a term to 
regulate them. We further discuss obsolete warranty terms in infra Section III.A.2. 
5. See e.g., Lisa Bernstein & Brad Peterson, Managerial Contracting: A Preliminary 
Study, 2–3 (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on �ile with author) (footnotes omitted). 
Over the past four decades a number of technological and other changes 
have strongly affected American manufacturing—among them: �irms 
outsourcing all but core competencies, shorter product cycle times, the 
increased pace of technological change, the widespread adoption of just-
in-time inventory methods, the outsourcing of design and innovation not 
just production, and the need to meet a variety of competitive challenges 
including those created by the introduction of high quality Japanese 
products in the early 1980s. These changes, in turn, have led to new 
problems that procurement contracts have to solve and have 
fundamentally changed the nature of contractual relationships in 
manufacturing. 
Id. See also John L. Pence & P. Saacke, A Survey of Companies that Demand Supply Quality, in 
42ND ANNUAL QUALITY CONGRESS TRANSACTIONS (1988) (documenting that companies 
decreasingly relied on warranties to ensure quality and instead used other quality control 
measures). We discuss the many ways that contracting practices have changed over recent 
years in infra Part II.A. 
 6. For discussion, see Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1009 
(2002). An institution called “The Permanent Editorial Board” is supposed to keep the UCC 
current, but the Board’s recommendations must be approved by the ALI and ULC before being 
recommended to the states for adoption. The Board has made few signi�icant 
recommendations and fewer have been adopted. See id. at 1049; Permanent Editorial Board 
for Uniform Commercial Code, ULC, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-
home?CommunityKey=ffaa1a04-3d69-40f5-95bd-7adac186ef28 (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) 
(documenting the activities of The Permanent Editorial Board). Similarly, the ALI has no 
institution for updating Restatements. We discuss the failed efforts to revise Article 2 and the 
Restatement in infra Sections IV.B.1–.2. 
 7. A bankruptcy specialist recently explained:  
The market-sale process arose although it was not the means of 
restructuring that the 1978 Code favored or even anticipated. Even today, 
the sale derives its authority from two broad, open-ended sentences in 
the Code that lack texture, standards, speci�ics, and instructions. 
Nevertheless, the market sale has become a prime system of industrial 
restructuring in the United States. Market conditions prevailed over 
statutory structure and, one can probably say, over congressional intent.  
Mark J. Roe, Three Ages of Bankruptcy, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 187, 189 (2017). We discuss the 
political economy issues that prevent updating of bankruptcy law in infra Part IV.C. 
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An obsolete term in a restatement, statute, or even a private contract is 
not innocuous.8 There are two concerns. First, suppose that a UCC sales law 
default rule ef�iciently solved a contracting problem when enacted, but the 
world has evolved to a different state in which the problem takes a different 
form. The private lawmaking groups created the UCC default rule because it 
was too costly for contracting parties to solve the problem for themselves.9 
If it remains too costly for private agents to solve the problem ef�iciently in 
its current form, obsolescence causes parties to treat the problem with 
second-best solutions.10 The second concern with obsolescence is that a 
vestigial default could transition from being harmless but unhelpful to being 
dangerous. Such transitions can occur when a default applies linguistically, 
but not substantively, to the current version of the parties’ contracting 
problem. A party behaving strategically may then attempt to exploit the 
linguistic �it to generate an unfair or inef�icient judicial interpretation in its 
favor.11 
                                                                                                                                                    
 8. Even with the help of market institutions, commercial parties are often unable to 
update their contracts themselves. We discuss the causes and consequences of commercial 
parties’ inability to revise obsolete terms in infra Parts III–IV. 
 9. Three reasons have been offered to explain why the private sector underproduces 
contract innovation: (i) A contracting dyad would bear the full costs of innovation but could 
appropriate only a fraction of the gains; (ii) Parties who develop innovative solutions bear 
signi�icant legal risks. Because the legal system retains the power over interpretation and 
enforcement, parties cannot be certain what effect will be given to any solution to a 
contracting problem until it is tested in litigation; (iii) Accumulated experiences are important 
in in creating solutions to contracting problems. Individual parties may lack this experience, 
but the state can aggregate the experiences of numerous parties. In sum, the common 
justi�ication for state-supplied default rules is that the state can create an apt rule more 
cheaply and better than individual parties can. It was this logic that led to the adoption of the 
many default rules in the UCC. For more discussion on the role of the state in �illing contractual 
gaps, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the 
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 273–76 (1985) 
[hereinafter Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice]. 
 10. We discuss the problem of second-best solutions in infra Part II.B. 
 11. Standard form contracts in the sovereign debt market illustrate this danger of 
obsolescence. In 2016, activist creditors successfully held out from a debt restructuring offer 
by Argentina after asserting a novel—and widely condemned—interpretation of the historic 
pari passu clause found in almost all sovereign debt contracts. In the common understanding, 
the obsolete pari passu clause was an inconsequential clause in the agreement between the 
lender and each borrower, specifying how much the creditor would be repaid. The holdout 
creditors, however, claimed that the clause instead was an agreement among the creditors. As 
such, the agreement would be breached if some but not all of the creditors accepted the 
debtor’s settlement offer. The creditors who objected thus could enjoin the other creditors 
from receiving any payment. The bonds’ ancient language permitted strategic creditors to 
force a billion dollar settlement, though the result was inconsistent with current practice and 
probably inef�icient. And the pari passu clause has been dif�icult to update: Bonds worth many 
billions of dollars were sold under the clause for years after the holdouts initially mounted a 
challenge. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in 
Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L. J. 1, 19–21 (2017) [hereinafter Choi, Gulati & Scott, The 
Black Hole Problem]. For a discussion of the costs and persistence of obsolete boilerplate 
terms in large interdependent markets, see infra Part III.C. 
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The persistence and signi�icant costs of obsolescence demand a critical 
reexamination of the institutional features of the commercial law 
production process. In this Article, we focus speci�ically on the comparative 
institutional question: How have private markets and the three legal 
institutions governing commercial contract law—courts, public and private 
rules for managing specialized areas, and general contract law 
codi�ications—fared in their responses to the obsolescence concern? 
We begin that inquiry by brie�ly reviewing how the developments over 
the past one hundred years have produced our modern commercial law. For 
around 700 years, from 1200 to 1900, only one institution—common law 
courts—functioned in England and America.12 Courts could function 
unaided for so many years because intrinsic to common law adjudication is 
a mechanism for generating a particular subset of ef�icient contract law 
rules. Consider, for example, a case of �irst impression in which the parties’ 
contract lacks a term to resolve their dispute so the court has to �ill the 
gap.13 The court’s decision may become a rule when future parties 
recognize that the initial court’s resolution of the case faces them with a 
choice: to respond to the �irst case with an express term that regulates the 
same dispute or to leave a gap in the contract. If a subsequent contracting 
dyad leaves a gap, the �irst case becomes a precedent in the sense that the 
court will resolve the later dyad’s dispute with the rule that it used to 
resolve the initial dispute. Rules in cases thus become default terms in 
contracts that are written later unless parties contract out.14 
A court’s decision can function as an ef�icient precedent, however, only 
if four conditions are satis�ied: (i) Parties in other commercial contexts face 
the same contracting problem as the parties in the �irst case; (ii) The 
solution to the problem conditions on veri�iable information;15 (iii) The 
                                                                                                                                                    
 12. See generally A.W. B. Simpson, Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law, 91 L. 
Q. REV. 247 (1975) (describing the role of early common law courts). This situation changed 
in England in 1898 with the Sale of Goods Act and changed in America in 1906 with the 
Uniform Sales Act. These statutes, however, largely replicated the common law. 
 13. For an earlier description of how the common law functions, see Alan Schwartz & 
Robert E. Scott, The Common Law of Contract and the Default Rule Project, 102 VA. L. REV. 1523, 
1546–51 (2016) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, The Default Rule Project]. 
 14. To further illustrate this process, suppose that in the �irst case a retail store rejects 
a tire shipment but does not notify the seller in time for the seller to cure the defect or to 
substitute a conforming tender. The parties’ contract did not cover the noti�ication issue, but 
the initial court holds that buyers have a duty to notify their sellers promptly of defective 
deliveries. Now consider claims of late notice by sellers in a dispute between a farmer and a 
grain elevator, a battery maker and an auto company, and a �iber optic maker and a telecom 
company. In each of these cases, suppose the parties’ contract did not contain a term dealing 
with the time for rejection of defective goods. And in each case the court, citing the �irst case, 
held that buyers have a duty to give timely noti�ication of breach. In this way, the initial court’s 
decision became a precedent in three cases in three different industries: It has become the 
law. 
 15. Information is veri�iable if a) parties can observe it, and b) it would be cost justi�ied 
for parties to prove its existence in court. For example, market prices are veri�iable because 
they are easy for both parties to observe and cheap to prove. In contrast, buyers usually 
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later parties left a contract gap: Their agreements did not otherwise 
regulate the problem, thereby creating the opportunity for later courts to 
rule on the issue; and (iv) The initial court’s ruling solved the problem as 
the parties would have solved it had they contracted over it. But condition 
(iv) implies condition (iii): The future parties will have left a contract gap 
only because the rule in the �irst case ef�iciently solved their problem. 
This sketch of the common law adjudication mechanism shows that a 
common law contract rule has two key properties. First, the rule is 
“transcontextual”: The rule ef�iciently solves a contracting problem for 
parties functioning in diverse contexts.16 If the rule in the �irst case lacked 
this property, the rule would be a historical curiosity only. Future parties in 
other areas would not have left a contract gap, but rather would have 
contracted about the problem for themselves. The second property is that 
the rule roughly tracks changing commercial patterns. When commerce 
materially changes, parties do different deals under new contracts. If the 
future parties’ contracts nevertheless also leave a gap where a solution to 
the problem could be found, the rule in the �irst case continues to function 
as a precedent: The rule has been “updated.” But if parties functioning in 
new commercial situations create contracts that expressly govern the issue, 
the rule in the �irst case becomes vestigial: It has no current function. 
However, the common law mechanism, triggered by current disputes, will 
then create new rules when the four conditions speci�ied above are 
satis�ied.17 
The updating feature of the common law mechanism has an inherent 
limitation, however. Parties in different commercial contexts often require 
solutions that are speci�ic to their circumstances. But generalist courts are 
ill-equipped to supply speci�ic solutions to particular industries. The 
solution they suggest for a speci�ic problem will likely not be the outcome 
that the parties would have speci�ied had they contracted over the issue. 
                                                                                                                                                    
cannot observe their seller’s costs, and production functions are costly to prove. Hence, a good 
remedy default would condition on market prices but seldom on seller costs. See Robert E. 
Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 CASE W. 
RSRV. L. REV. 187, 191–92, 195 (2005). 
 16. The process by which common law courts develop transcontextual default rules that 
apply across many disparate industries is developed formally in Schwartz & Scott, The Default 
Rule Project, supra note 13, at 1546–51. 
 17. This explanation for how contract law is made complements the standard narrative. 
In that narrative, great judges—Mans�ield, Cardozo, Hand—created rules that last. The 
mechanism explanation is consistent with this view: The more commercially sophisticated 
and competent the judge is in the �irst case, the more likely the judge is to solve the parties’ 
contracting problem ef�iciently. And then later parties are more likely to leave a gap into 
which the �irst court’s rule can �it. But the mechanism explanation does not rely on unusual 
judicial creativity. The rule in the �irst case, whether artfully or poorly conceived, will stick if 
the rule satis�ies the four conditions; otherwise not. Put another way, we do not claim that the 
common law in general is ef�icient or that courts have a particular expertise in creating 
ef�icient common law rules. Rather, an ef�icient contract law rule, we argue, is the joint 
product of a plausible judicial solution to a contracting problem together with the 
uncoordinated decisions of heterogeneous contracting parties to accept that solution. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3788595
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That failure, in turn, implies that future parties in the industry would not 
leave a gap in their contract and no default rule would be formed. Private 
lawmakers responded to this regulatory gap by creating discrete bodies of 
commercial law, including secured credit to regulate transactions between 
creditors and their debtor, and commercial paper and bank deposits to 
regulate short-term �inancing transactions.18 Many of these discrete 
lawmaking efforts have been regularly updated as focused interest group 
pressures stimulate reform proposals.19 Yet, this focused response to the 
risk of obsolescence raises a further concern: Interest group pressure 
produces specialized commercial rules that are privately ef�icient but not 
necessarily socially ef�icient.20 This disregard for the public interest justi�ies 
a continuing role for general contract law rules that take broader social 
interests into account.21 
The American legal establishment long recognized, therefore, that a 
modern economy bene�its from a law that applies to contracts generally but, 
for several reasons, American lawyers were unsatis�ied with the common 
law mechanism. The �irst reason follows from our earlier analysis: Default 
rules are slow to form. Litigation must proceed over time in different 
contexts before a default rule is fully formed. Consequently, most of the 
common law default rules were developed in the 19th century following the 
industrial revolution, and the process of rule development slowed 
considerably thereafter.22 Because the process of developing default rules 
had slowed, courts had relatively few general rules with which to �ill gaps in 
                                                                                                                                                    
 18. See, e.g., U.C.C art. 9 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N amended 2010); id. arts. 3, 4 (AM. 
L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N amended 2002). 
 19. Article 9 of the UCC regulating secured credit has been updated twice—in 1978 and 
again in 1999. It was subsequently amended in 2010. Article 3 on negotiable instruments and 
Article 4 regulating bank deposits and collections were revised in 1990 and amended in 2002. 
For discussion of the interest group pressures that stimulate updating of specialized 
commercial �ields, see generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of 
Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, The Political 
Economy] (applying structure-induced equilibrium theory to show that interest group 
pressures in the ALI and ULC produce current rules that advance the groups goals). 
 20. Article 9 of the UCC is an apt example of the potential divergence between private 
and public interests. Article 9 rationalized numerous pre-Code statutes governing the priority 
of secured creditors’ claims and in the process simpli�ied and reduced the costs of issuing 
secured debt. But critics have long argued that the priority given to secured creditors in 
Article 9 functions to redistribute wealth away from unsophisticated creditors, particularly 
tort claimants, employees and small suppliers. See e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured 
Creditors Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1941–47 (1994). We discuss the political economy of 
the recent revisions to Article 9 in Part V.B.1. 
 21. The supplementary role of contract law as the backstop to speci�ic statutory 
regulation is made explicit, for example, in UCC § 1–103(b) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 
2001) (“Unless displaced by the particular provisions of the UCC, the principles of law and 
equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity in contract, principal and 
agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy and other 
validating or invalidating cause supplement its provisions.”). 
 22. See Schwartz & Scott, The Default Rule Project, supra note 13, at 1534–1537. 
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incomplete contracts.23 This stasis in common law rule development 
followed from the second reason: Courts are poor regulators of a modern 
economy. Courts cannot �ind facts, apart from case records, and so cannot 
hold accurate views of the context in which a possible rule will function and 
the effects of current rules. In addition, judges are generalist lawyers. The 
typical judge has little commercial expertise and cannot effectively resolve 
the economic issues that a possible rule may pose. Another rule generating 
mechanism was required. 
Widespread dissatisfaction with the common law process produced 
the two major interventions that sought to change contract law itself. The 
�irst effort at a codi�ication of contract law occurred at the turn of the 20th 
century when the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) produced the Uniform 
Sales Act.24 That effort soon proved obsolete, however, and throughout the 
interwar period only the courts were able to keep sales law current with 
changing commercial practice.25 This led to the second effort by the 
American Law Institute (ALI) and the ULC in the mid-20th century to codify 
the general law of contracts.26 Article 2 of the UCC governing sales 
transactions has since been enacted in every state (except Louisiana) and it 
was followed by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which usefully 
summarized important contract doctrines for common law courts. The 
Restatement also had a distinct policy focus, identifying some contract rules 
as better solutions to a given contracting problem than others.27 
The justi�ication for the codi�ication of general contract law rules 
follows from the dissatisfaction with the common law process. UCC drafters 
and the ALI members responsible for particular restatements are thought 
to be more expert and to have more real-world knowledge than the typical 
common law judge. Moreover, the felt need for more default rules is 
genuine: Private parties will not solve every contracting problem that they 
face. Contracting parties seldom can internalize the full gain from creating 
a useful solution to a common contracting problem—others can copy their 
innovation—but nonetheless they bear the full cost.28 When the cost 
exceeds a contracting dyad’s share of the gain, the problem will not be 
solved ef�iciently without outside help. Private lawmakers can use their 
expertise and knowledge to solve these common problems and supply 
contracting parties with the solutions in the form of UCC or Restatement 
                                                                                                                                                    
 23. Id. at 1535, 1542, 1550. 
 24. The Uniform Sales Act was promulgated in 1906 and ultimately adopted in 34 states. 
Robert Braucher, The Uniform Commercial Code, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 831, 831 n.4 (1954). 
 25. Grant Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 7 U. COLO. L. REV. 461, 469–71 (1966-7). 
 26. The �irst Restatement was adopted in 1933, followed by the UCC project which was 
completed in 1952. The Second Restatement followed in 1979. See The Story of ALI, ALI, 
https://www.ali.org/about-ali/story-line/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2020). 
 27. For example, the Restatement adopted a contextual approach to problems of parol 
evidence and interpretation in lieu of the textualist rules that had emerged from the common 
law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §§ 209-223 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1981). 
 28. Goetz &. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice, supra note 9, at 292–93 (1985). 
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sections. In prior work we have criticized the rationale for this method of 
supplying contract terms on the ground that the ALI and ULC are also 
institutionally limited.29 We focus here, however, on the deeper 
institutional problem. As we said above, a public program of supplying 
contract law rules must satisfy two conditions: The rules must �irst solve 
contracting problems as the parties would have solved them; and second, 
the rules must update promptly as economic conditions change. In this 
Article, we show that even if the ALI and ULC once supplied rules that 
parties themselves would have chosen, these private groups no longer do 
so: Their rules remain but the problems have changed.  
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the dramatic changes 
in contemporary contracting practices that have rendered state-supplied 
default rules, as well as those we designate as “quasi-mandatory” rules, 
obsolete. We develop an economic theory that shows parties will reject an 
obsolete state-supplied default because the term cannot solve the current 
version of their contracting problem and bad faith parties could exploit the 
term strategically. But parties are unlikely to create a new term equivalent 
to an apt state-supplied default because of its excessive cost. The theory 
predicts that parties instead will replace the obsolete default term with 
second-best solutions. Yet, the obsolete default lives on. Similarly, parties 
can only escape the constraints imposed by an obsolete quasi-mandatory 
rule by costly contracting around the rule. Finally, Part II analyzes the 
coordination problems that may prevent private parties from revising 
obsolete terms in standardized interdependent contracts. 
Part III provides evidence of the persistence and costs of obsolete 
terms. Here we show how the theory developed in Part II explains many of 
the contracting patterns we observe as parties attempt to adjust to the 
constraints imposed by obsolete default and quasi-mandatory rules. 
Consistent with the theory, parties avoid obsolete terms by settling on less 
ef�icient alternatives. This Part also presents evidence that parties in large, 
multilateral markets often fail to revise standardized obsolete terms 
notwithstanding the heightened level of litigation risk that they face as a 
result. 
In Part IV we consider the several systemic reasons that explain why 
UCC Article 2, the Restatement, and the Bankruptcy Code remain rocks in 
the river of changing commercial practice. Obsolescence persists when 
coordination on an ef�icient replacement fails because individual parties 
would bear too much of the cost and internalize too few of the gains to 
reward efforts to initiate legal change. The private lawmaking bodies that 
created today’s obsolete contract law rules also are poorly equipped 
institutionally to create current ones. These institutions meet episodically, 
have little incentive to update the rules by adopting controversial reforms, 
                                                                                                                                                    
 29. See generally, Schwartz & Scott, The Default Rule Project, supra note 13; Schwartz & 
Scott, The Political Economy, supra note 19. 
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and interest group competition can instantiate a status quo bias.30 And 
when the rule making process is captured by insiders, as in the case of 
bankruptcy, specialized rules also can become “sticky.”31 
Part V revisits commercial law’s production problem. Here we ask how 
other institutions that supply commercial law rules have responded to the 
obsolescence concern. Some private interests have created specialized 
contract terms that parties are then invited to adopt in their contracts, but 
this solution to updating is still underproduced. The two public institutions 
that are largely free from persistent obsolescence are specialized 
lawmaking bodies and common law courts. Organized interest groups that 
supply rules for specialized �ields can update their rules but at the cost of 
promoting private interests over the public interest. What remains are 
common law courts, the institution with which we began. Courts’ rules are 
ef�icient and update over time, but at �irst blush do not appear to cover much 
of the ground. We show, however, that once arti�icial institutional 
boundaries are set aside, the activity of common law courts is more vibrant 
than is commonly assumed. 
We conclude in Part VI that the splintering of our general contract law 
into contract laws for specialized �ields—such as corporate, bankruptcy, 
and �inancial contracting—points to an emerging institutional response to 
the externalities that the specialized laws create. 
We have two closing observations. First, the common view is that 
general contract law is created by two institutions: common law courts and 
“private legislatures” such as the ALI and the ULC that produce UCC Article 
2 and the Restatements. This view is incorrect because both of these 
contract law products are largely obsolete.32 Today, there are courts and 
                                                                                                                                                    
 30. See generally Schwartz & Scott, The Political Economy, supra note 19; Schwartz & 
Scott, The Default Rule Project, supra note 13. 
 31. See infra note 54; see also infra Section II.B.1. 
       32. We note here an important distinction between the UCC and the Restatement. 
The UCC is an enacted statute and thus when parties escape an obsolete UCC rule, the 
obsolete rule lives on and imposes costs on subsequent parties. The Restatement is 
directed to courts. An obsolete Restatement rule thus becomes law once it is used 
strategically in litigation to advance a client’s claim and a court is persuaded to adopt the 
rule even though it is not, in fact, an apt solution to the contracting problem in question. 
In assessing the cost of obsolescence, the UCC statute imposes greater costs than the 
obsolete Restatement rule, because a court may never be persuaded to adopt the 
Restatement rule, and if a court does so, the rule ultimately will disappear as parties 
choose not to leave a gap that can be filled by the obsolete rule. However, once an 
obsolete Restatement rule is adopted by a court it cannot be readily discarded and 
replaced by a more current default.  The Restatement occupies a much different status 
in judicial interpretation than an emerging common law default rule that is found in 
some but not all states. The Restatement presents itself as the "uniform approach" that 
other courts have (or should have) adopted. Indeed, that is the whole point of the 
imprimatur of the ALI; to promote uniformity in rule formation. Thus, once adopted, a 
Restatement default takes on a quasi-statutory status.  So long as contracting parties 
perceive the obsolete Restatement rule as having a special status, just as with an obsolete 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3788595
 THE INTRACTABLE PRODUCTION PROBLEM 13 
episodic, specialized interventions. The question we raise is whether this is 
the best American law can do. 
Second, we note the novelty of our analysis. There are two signi�icant 
prior contributions. Grant Gilmore observed that early 20th century 
codi�ication efforts became obsolete, but for reasons that differ from ours. 
According to Gilmore, these uniform law codi�ications were intended to 
“embalm the past”—that is, to solve yesterday’s doctrinal problems and 
enact the solutions into law. 33 A codi�ication that does this will inevitably 
become obsolete because the future poses different doctrinal problems. But 
the UCC and Restatement were not so much meant to solve old legal 
problems as to solve, in the form of default and quasi-mandatory rules, 
current economic problems. In contrast to Gilmore, we show that such laws 
become obsolete only when the economic problems either disappear or 
take new forms. 
Guido Calabresi wrote an important book about obsolete statutes and 
judicial responses.34 Calabresi’s subject was the statute that had outlived its 
animating purpose but that continued to affect behavior because it was a 
statute. He then asked how courts respond to an obsolete law by analyzing 
the strengths courts exhibit and the constraints they function under when 
attempting to make such laws current. We also observe that obsolescence 
occurs for statutes that are dif�icult to update. But, in contrast to Calabresi, 
we analyze the case of an obsolete commercial law that no longer affects 
behavior because parties contract out of the law’s terms. As a consequence, 
our subject concerns how parties respond when a law that was supposed to 
solve the parties’ contracting problems no longer does so. Thus, the 
comparative question we ask—which legal institution can best create an 
ef�icient law to regulate commercial contracting—is entirely novel. Nor has 
any prior work analyzed contract obsolescence as a discrete problem, to ask 
why and where such obsolescence exists, and how it can persist. We 
recognize, however, that our more important contribution may be to 
introduce the subject of comparative institutional analysis to private law 
�ields. 
II. A THEORY OF OBSOLESCENCE. 
It is commonly accepted that some statutes and restatements were 
written long ago, and that commerce has changed over the succeeding 
decades. The question is how much, and does it matter? In Part II.A we 
answer that question by summarizing the evidence that contracting 
practices have changed signi�icantly and demonstrating that many of the 
default rules in the UCC and the Restatement are no longer apt responses to 
                                                                                                                                                    
UCC provision they will turn to second best options rather than attempting to formulate 
the efficient default. See infra Section II.B.2 
 33. Gilmore, supra note 25, at 467–68. 
 34. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). 
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current contracting practices. Part II.B seeks to answer two questions: (i) Is 
obsolescence, in any of its forms, costly to current parties? And (ii) why does 
it persist? We set out a formal example that illustrates how obsolete rules 
impose substantial costs on private parties and yet persist over time. Part 
II.C then clari�ies the coordination problem that prevents parties to certain 
standardized interdependent contracts from replacing obsolete terms with 
apt alternatives. 
A. The Changing World of Contracting Practices 
The UCC sales law and the Restatement presuppose the following 
pattern of commerce: Merchants trade �inished goods to each other or to 
retailers in discrete short-term transactions. The merchant seller either 
imports goods that it resells or buys goods from another merchant and 
resells them. This pattern continues to exist in some parts of the economy, 
but there are four legally relevant and economically signi�icant differences 
between much of today’s commercial world and the world that the UCC and 
the Restatement presupposed. Each of these differences point to the 
absence of apt default rules to solve current commercial problems. 
1. Providing Remedies for Long-Term Contracts 
Parties today make long-term contracts, particularly to sell raw 
materials such as coal, oil, gas, and metals.35 The UCC and Restatement 
damage sections, however, presuppose discrete short-term transactions 
and thus cannot facilitate these long-term contracts.36 For example, if the 
seller breaches in year three of a seven-year contract, the buyer cannot 
recover UCC market damages because these measure the difference 
between the contract and market prices: Although thick markets for 
commodities and metals exist, a court could not �ind this difference for later 
years.37 The buyer also could not recover UCC consequential damages 
                                                                                                                                                    
 35. A party requiring a continuous supply of a particular material for its business 
operations (such as an airline company for jet fuel or an automobile manufacturer for metals) 
bene�its from entering into long-term contracts with suppliers. This ensures the buyer a 
reliable supply of the essential material at an agreeable price point, thereby protecting against 
extreme market �luctuations. Long-term contracts also encourage mutual investment into the 
contractual relationship, which over time makes the relationship more valuable vis-à-vis the 
rest of the market by increasing the expected returns for both parties. As trust and 
cooperation grow, problems of hidden information and actions are reduced, as is the need for 
formal sanctions. This ultimately reduces transaction costs and further increases the value of 
the contract. For an expanded discussion of these ideas, see Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, 
The Theory of Contracts, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY, FIFTH WORLD CONGRESS 71, 128–147 
(Truman F. Bewley ed., 1987). 
 36. The UCC does endorse output and requirements contracts as well as open price 
terms. See U.C.C. §§ 2–306 & 2–305 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1952). These terms are key 
feature to many long-term contracts, but the damage provisions were not adapted to that new 
reality. 
 37. See, e.g., U.C.C.§ 2–713 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1952) (stating that the measure 
of damages for repudiation by the seller is “the difference between the market price at the 
time the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price”). 
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because they could not establish the future lost pro�its from the seller’s 
current breach.38 
Because the standard remedies are not apt, courts speci�ically enforce 
many long-term contracts.39 Speci�ic performance is a compensatory 
remedy in the case of short-term, discrete transactions: The court simply 
orders the seller to transfer the goods. But the remedy is less satisfactory in 
long-term contracts because courts are reluctant to police complex, long-
term economic arrangements, thereby creating opportunities for strategic 
behavior by both parties. Moreover, it is costly for a party to make periodic 
court appearances to ensure that its counterparty is complying with the 
court’s order. Parties thus attempt to avoid the need for contract remedies 
altogether by indexing contract prices to the prices in markets for inputs, 
outputs or both (e.g., electricity costs, raw materials, producer or consumer 
price indices). These attempts sometimes fail, however, and when they do 
the UCC again is unhelpful. How far must the prices generated by the index 
depart from the prices that current economic conditions would warrant to 
justify a court in not enforcing the index prices? And, if a court does not 
enforce, which party should bear the risk of a failed index? Neither the UCC 
nor the Restatement help courts to make speci�ic performance more 
effective or help in answering these questions.40 
2. Interpreting Governance Agreements 
The litigation over index clauses highlights the second major difference 
between the commercial world today and the world that prevailed 50 to 75 
years ago: Current contracts often are not contracts in the traditional sense. 
Rather, they are governing documents that create structures to guide 
parties in producing complex goods. These documents present an 
interpretive challenge that the UCC did not foresee. Under the Code, 
interpretive issues are assumed to involve attributing meaning to contested 
terms. The UCC thus directs courts to ask if there is a custom in the trade, or 
a course of dealing or course of performance that would provide courts with 
                                                                                                                                                    
 38. See U.C.C. § 2–715, cmt. 4 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1952) (“The burden of 
proving the extent of loss incurred by way of consequential damage is on the buyer . . . .’). 
 39. See, e.g., Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil, 522 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975) (enforcing a 
propane supply contract); Io. Electr. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. 
Iowa 1978) (ordering speci�ic performance of uranium yellowcake supply contract), rev’d and 
remanded for lack of personal jurisdiction, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979); E. Airlines Inc. v. Gulf 
Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla.1975) (ordering speci�ic performance of a jet fuel supply 
contract despite substantial increases in crude oil prices). For a recent study documenting the 
increase in parties contracting for speci�ic performance in M&A transactions, see Theresa 
Arnold et al, Speci�ic Performance Clauses in Action, 2021 WISC. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), 
available on ssrn at https://ssrn/abstract=3696103. 
 40. A celebrated example of the failure of the UCC and the Restatement rules in helping 
courts make the speci�ic performance versus excuse question more salient is Judge 
Teitelbaum’s tortured opinion ordering reformation of the contract’s complex and heavily 
negotiated index clause in Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Grp., Inc., 499 F.Supp. 53 (W.D. 
Pa. 1980). 
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context when reading the contract’s words.41 These interpretive aids were 
sometimes helpful for contracts made in earlier times, but in today’s 
complex governance arrangements there is likely no relevant custom or 
course of dealing to inform a court’s interpretive judgment, nor is there a 
trade in the traditional sense.42 To interpret today’s long lasting governance 
contracts, courts have to understand complex economic arrangements that 
do much more than specify price, quantity, and describe “the goods.” 
Indeed, in some of these contracts there is no quantity term at all,43 prices 
change as a function of current conditions, and the goods are designed and 
produced thereafter. Hence, there is nothing to describe at the time of 
contracting. The contracts instead often prescribe behavior: A seller invites 
buyer representatives into its factory to participate in creating a product; a 
buyer invites sellers into its factory to facilitate installation and to remedy 
initial defects. Disputes involve a party’s premature withdrawal from an 
arrangement or behavior that is allegedly inconsistent with the 
arrangement’s purpose.44 No UCC or Restatement section provides courts 
with interpretive resources to adjudicate such disputes. 
3. Motivating Investment 
Simple sales contracts do not attempt to induce one or both parties to 
invest in the transaction: Classic contracts govern only trade. Modern 
contracts govern both trade and investment. As an example, consider a 
multi-stage arrangement in which two agents plan to develop a new 
                                                                                                                                                    
 41. See U.C.C § 2–202(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1952) (“[W]riting intended by 
parties as a �inal expression of their agreement . . . may be explained or supplemented by 
course of dealing or usage of trade . . . or by course of performance.”). Comment 2 explains 
that “[s]uch writings are to be read on the assumption that the course of prior dealings 
between the parties and the usages of trade were taken for granted when the document was 
phrased. Unless carefully negated they have become an element of the meaning of the words 
used.” Id. cmt. 2. 
 42. There is virtually no evidence that courts, even those operating under the UCC’s 
invitation to broadly examine context, ever conducted serious empirical investigations, and 
hence little reason to imagine they could succeed if they did. In fact, recent research suggests 
that on-going, “traditional” dealings never crystalized into well de�ined, customary rules at 
all. See, e.g., Emily Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 
1156–1159, 1177–1181 (2012). See generally Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modern 
Economy, in Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law 238 (Gregory Klass et al. eds., 2014) 
[hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modern Economy] (presenting empirical evidence 
rebutting the UCC’s assumptions that trade usages exist and can be reliably taken into 
account); Lisa Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 63 (2015) (presenting 
empirical evidence showing that courts typically rely on unreliable party testimony rather 
than expert testimony or statistical evidence to establish usages). 
 43. In the mid-twentieth century, courts often held that the absence of a quantity term 
in a contract to trade discrete goods would make the contract too inde�inite to enforce. See 
e.g., R. A. Weaver & Assocs., Inc. v. Asphalt Const., Inc. 587 F.2d 1315, 1315 (1978) (declining 
to enforce a requirements contract that failed to specify a quantity term); Fort Wayne 
Corrugated Paper Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 130 F. 2d 471, 473 (3d Cir. 1942) 
(holding that “the buyer in a requirements contract has no duty to have any requirements and 
a seller under an output contract has no duty to have any output”). 
 44. See Bernstein & Peterson, supra note 5, at 38–40. 
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product, if one would turn out to be feasible for them. Each agent has tasks 
to perform—research technical issues, research marketing issues, etc. At 
each stage, the agents report their results to each other. When the results 
are favorable, the agents move to the next stage. The arrangement ends 
positively when there is a product, but then the agents must develop a 
protocol for how to trade the product between them or how to exploit it 
jointly. Because the agents cannot observe each other’s ongoing actions, the 
arrangement poses challenges: how to ensure that the agents will report 
truthfully to each other; invest ef�iciently; continue with the arrangement 
when continuation would increase value rather than accept an outside 
option; and trade the product to the highest valuing party.45 It is almost 
otiose to say that the UCC and Restatement give courts no guidance on how 
to resolve disputes that arise under such modern arrangements. Instead, as 
we show in Part V, common law courts have led the way in developing new 
default rules governing the legal effects of the preliminary agreements that 
initially structure such arrangements,46 as well as the legal effects that 
attend innovative collaborative contracts.47 
4. Enforcing Collaborative Agreements 
This discussion introduces a fourth difference—a profound 
transformation of contracting practice and contract law is occurring today. 
This transformation coincides with an increased rate of change in the 
business environment that is generally attributed to the information 
revolution. There is a rapid spread of new forms of collaborative innovation 
among independent �irms at the pioneering and most productive frontier of 
                                                                                                                                                    
 45. The complex contracts that parties use to induce truth telling between them and 
ef�icient investment are described in Tracy Lewis & Alan Schwartz, Pay to Play: A Theory of 
Hybrid Relationships, 17 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 462 (2016). 
 46. For discussion of the innovative default rules that are emerging from common law 
courts dealing with these new governance arrangements, see Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, 
Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 691–702 (2007). 
[hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, Preliminary Agreements]. The modern framework for 
determining the legal status of these preliminary agreements was �irst proposed by Judge 
Pierre Leval in Tchrs. Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of America v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491 (1987). 
The framework sets out a new default rule for cases in which the parties contemplate further 
negotiations. This rule binds the parties to negotiate further in good faith in seeking to achieve 
a �inal agreement. Id. at 498–499. Thus, it relaxes the knife-edge character of the common law, 
under which agreements were either fully enforceable or not enforceable at all. The Leval 
framework is now followed in at least thirteen states, sixteen federal district courts and seven 
federal circuits. Schwartz & Scott, Preliminary Agreements, supra, at 664 n.7. See, e.g., Brown 
v. Cara, 420 F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that a preliminary agreement to develop 
real estate imposed a duty to negotiate in good faith to reach a deal). See also discussion in 
infra Part V.B. 
 47. See e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Emisphere Techs., Inc, 408 F. Supp. 2d, 668, 694–96 (S.D. 
Ind. 2006) (holding that a collaborative agreement for drug development was violated when 
one party conducted secret research); Medinol Ltd. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 346 F. Supp. 2d 575, 
627 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (addressing breach of contract claims involving an extensive 
collaboration for the development, marketing and distribution of medical stents). See also 
discussion in infra Part V.B. 
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nearly every area of the economy.48 Large pharmaceutical companies now 
routinely develop new drugs in concert with specialized biotech �irms.49 
Automobile producers routinely co-develop key components ranging from 
sophisticated fuel injection systems to transmissions with specialist 
suppliers.50 Today, in every sector of the economy, vertical integration is 
replaced by supply chains linked together by collaborative contracts. Here, 
formal and informal contractual networks function as mechanisms for 
coordination and cooperation in response to increases in uncertainty. 
Nothing in the UCC or the Restatement helps courts to adjudicate 
contractual disputes in these contexts.51 
                                                                                                                                                    
 48. For an extended discussion of the new forms of collaborative contracting and their 
role in adapting to an uncertain world, see generally Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert 
E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Inter�irm Collaboration, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 431 (2009) [hereinafter Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Contracting for Innovation]. 
 49. The development of new drugs based on biotechnology often entails contracting 
across organizational boundaries. Large pharmaceutical companies frequently lack the depth 
of scienti�ic knowledge and experience that provide the foundation for biotech research. 
Smaller biotech �irms typically lack the experience and capital both to take the drugs through 
the arduous process of obtaining FDA approval and then to commercially market the drug. 
See Leslie Gladstone Restaino, BioPharma Collaborative Agreements: Choosing the Right Deal 
Structure, METRO. CORP. COUNS. 47 (Nov. 2007), available at 
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2007/November/47.pdf. A prototypical exemplar 
of this form of collaborative contracting is the research, development, and license agreement 
between Warner-Lambert, a large pharmaceutical company, and Ligand Pharmaceutical, a 
much smaller biotech company, to discover and/or design small-molecule compounds that 
act on the estrogen receptors, to develop pharmaceutical products from such compounds and 
to take such products through the FDA approval process and commercialization. The 
agreement is available at WARNER-LAMBERT CO. & LIGAND PHARMS. INC., RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT 
AND LICENSE AGREEMENT (Sept. 1,1999), 
https://contracts.onecle.com/ligand/warner.rd.1999.09.01.shtml. For a discussion of these 
collaborative biotech agreements, see generally Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel, & Robert E. 
Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and 
Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010) [hereinafter Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Braiding]. 
 50. See, e.g., NANOSVS, INC. & MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC WORKS, LTD., DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT 
(Nov. 18, 2002) (collaboration agreement to develop photovoltaic devices with nano 
components), https://contracts.onecle.com/nanosys/matsushita.rd.2002.11.18.shtml; JOHN 
DEERE & CO. & STANADYNE CORP., LONG TERM AGREEMENT (Dec. 1, 2001) (�ive year supply 
contract for the purchase of fuel �iltration systems, injection nozzles, and related products by 
Deere from Stanadyne), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1053439/000119312507182449/dex1011.ht
m; AVSA S.A.R.L. & NEW AIR CORP., AIRBUS A320 PURCHASE AGREEMENT (April 20, 1999) (JetBlue 
and 
Airbus purchasing agreement), 
https://contracts.onecle.com/jetblue/airbus.a320.1999.04.20.shtml; AMERICAN AXLE & 
MANUFACTURING, INC. & GENERAL MOTORS CORP., COMPONENT SUPPLY AGREEMENT (June 5, 1998) 
(requirements contract for motor vehicle components to be supplied by AAM to GMM), 
https://www.lawinsider.com/contracts/4m3PYUmemP8JTRqokyjFmk/american-axle-
manufacturing-holdings-inc/supply-agreement/1998-06-05. 
 51. For a discussion of the failure of the Restatement rules governing third party 
bene�iciaries to deal adequately with contemporary contractual networks, see Alan Schwartz 
& Robert E. Scott, Third-Party Bene�iciaries and Contractual Networks, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 325, 
331–34 (2015). 
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In short, it is beyond dispute that commercial arrangements in the 
United States today differ substantially from the arrangements that 
obtained when our leading commercial laws were created. The private 
lawmakers who produce the UCC and the Restatement have not solved their 
production problem: how to keep the law current and useful. 
The reasons demonstrating that the UCC’s “machinery” for adapting to 
change is broken, and that argues for an entirely new approach to the 
content and theory of sales law, curiously parallels Karl Llewellyn’s reasons 
for advocating in 1940 for the adoption of an entirely new commercial code, 
rather than proposing extensive amendments to the Uniform Sales Act.52 As 
Llewellyn explained, the Sales Act was based on “concepts that took shape 
on the basis of a face-to-face dealing with present goods.” In contrast, the 
American economy in the 1920’s and 1930’s was increasingly dominated by 
the emergence of a “nationwide indirect marketing structure,” in which 
most contracts were executory and a large portion of trade was mediated 
by brokers and factors of various sorts. 53 Were Llewellyn here today he 
would doubtless agree that the resistance to change that doomed the Sales 
Act has now undermined his commercial code. 
B. The Persistence and Effects of Obsolete Default and Mandatory Rules 
1. A Taxonomy of Default and Quasi-mandatory Rules 
Commercial law rules commonly are grouped in three categories: (i) 
defaults, which attempt to solve a contracting problem as parties would 
have solved had they addressed it; (ii) sticky defaults, which attempt to 
solve a contracting problem as the regulator believes it should be solved and 
include barriers to contracting out;54 and (iii) mandatory rules, which 
require the solution to a contracting problem as the regulator believes it 
should be solved and prevent particular private solutions. The distinction 
between sticky defaults and mandatory rules is more �luid than is 
commonly supposed, however, because parties often can realize the 
solution they prefer by costly contracting around a mandatory rule.55 Thus, 
                                                                                                                                                    
 52. See generally Karl Llewellyn, The Needed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REV. 558 (1940). 
 53. Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modern Economy, supra note 42, at 270. 
 54. The most common sticky default is the “nudge,” which is an intervention that “alters 
people people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or signi�icantly 
changing their economic incentives.” RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2009). As an example, the regulator 
chooses a default retirement savings option for employees and requires employees to take 
af�irmative steps to choose a different option. See id. at 129–130. 
 55. An apt example of the ability to work around mandatory rules is the effort parties 
undertake to escape the ancient common law penalty doctrine. One method of escaping the 
penalty rule is to frame remedial provisions as substantive terms of the contract rather than 
as the consequences of a contract breach. Termination provisions, for example, grant the 
promisor the option to terminate the contract by incurring a cost that is unrelated to 
compensation. Similarly, parties may frame remedial provisions as substantive terms such as 
the right to cancel upon payment of a fee or loss of a deposit. For discussion, see Robert E. 
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we suggest a more illuminating way to classify commercial law rules: as 
either defaults, which supply parties with low-cost solutions to their 
contracting problems, or as “quasi-mandatory” (Q/M) rules which erect 
high-cost barriers that parties must overcome in order to create their 
preferred solutions. 
State-supplied terms thus can be arrayed along a continuum of 
increasing costs to contract out until a default becomes formally a 
mandatory rule. Because raising contracting cost reduces the net gain from 
a transaction, the Q/M default differs from the standard default in important 
ways. A standard default expands parties’ contractual space by increasing 
the set of contractual tools parties can use to achieve their contracting goals; 
the Q/M default constricts parties’ contractual space by reducing the set of 
contractual tools the parties can use.56 However, Q/M rules do not, as is 
commonly thought, restrict the contracting space altogether. 
A Q/M rule can become obsolete if one of two factors has changed. First, 
the defective contracting conditions that justi�ied making the state-supplied 
rule mandatory improve so that there no longer is a need for cost barriers 
to contracting out. The regulator then could demote the Q/M rule to a 
default. Second, the defective contracting conditions that justi�ied the rule 
resolve, but other justifying conditions emerge. In this case, there may be a 
need for a different mandatory rule.57 As we show below, party responses 
to obsolete Q/M defaults will be similar to their predicted responses to 
standard defaults: When there is either an obsolete default or an obsolete 
                                                                                                                                                    
Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 53–56 (2004). 
 56. To get the idea, assume the state creates a traditional default that would cost typical 
parties X to contract away from. The state could make the same default sticky by erecting a 
higher barrier to contracting out; now it would cost the typical party 2X to avoid. Next 
consider the mandatory rule against penalties. Parties would still like to write a penalty term 
at a cost of X to draft. But parties can only use other contractual methods to achieve the same 
goal; now it would cost the parties 3X to achieve their objective. On this view, the difference 
between a default, a sticky default, and a mandatory rule is one of degree (that is, cost). And 
the same criticism of sticky defaults applies to mandatory rules, in heightened form. Parties 
with a sophisticated contracting technology—lawyers, other experts, etc.—sometimes can 
avoid the ban on penalty terms but others cannot. 
 57. Q/M rules commonly implement a soft paternalism: The regulator chooses the 
contractual solution that, it believes, parties would choose under ideal contracting conditions. 
On this view of regulation, we have: (a) A standard default that supplies parties with the 
maximizing solution to their contracting problem but permits free contracting out because 
the regulator believes that the ideal conditions obtain. Hence, parties either choose to accept 
the default or contract to a solution that would be better for them; (b) A weak quasi-
mandatory rule—the sticky default—that supplies parties with the maximizing solution but 
erects cost barriers to contracting out because the regulator believes that the ideal conditions 
are only approximated. Parties thus should be discouraged from mistakenly choosing 
inef�icient solutions; and (c) A strong quasi-mandatory rule supplies parties with the ef�icient 
solution but erects very high-cost barriers to contracting out because the regulator believes 
that one or more of the ideal conditions do not obtain. In this case, a nontrivial fraction of 
parties, the regulator supposes, would choose a contracting solution that would be wrong for 
them if left free to do so. 
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Q/M rule, the parties can either make a “substitute contract” (that attempts, 
only sometimes successfully, to achieve the objective the obsolete term 
sought) or a “simple contract” that abandons the objective but is much less 
costly to write. 
2. An Example of Parties’ Responses to an Obsolete Default Rule 
Our analysis of the effect of obsolete default and Q/M rules is in the 
form of an extended example.58 We begin with two clarifying points. First, 
we make the heuristic assumption that the UCC and Restatement defaults 
were ef�icient when created. This is because our question is how contracting 
parties respond to obsolescence and a law that is useless at the start cannot 
become obsolete. Second, the example shows that parties most likely will 
not respond to an obsolete default by creating a currently ef�icient solution 
to their contracting problem. While we consider this possibility, we 
unsurprisingly �ind that creating an ef�icient replacement is the least 
probable outcome. Parties’ responses to an obsolete default will be dictated 
by the relative values of their contracting options. If a statutory default was 
created initially because the cost of solving the problem exceeded the 
bene�its accruing to any individual dyad, and the problem persists, the cost 
of contracting to achieve the �irst best likely will remain too high. Thus, the 
example’s contribution is to suggest that parties’ likely responses to 
contract obsolescence are either (i) to give up—to write a contract that is 
inexpensive to create, but that cannot solve the current problem; or (ii) to 
write a second-best contract that attempts to solve the problem but may fail 
to do so in many circumstances. The example thus makes a normative point: 
Contract obsolescence is a costly problem that markets seldom will solve 
unaided. 
a. The contracting problem: Parties attempt to motivate a 
seller to invest ef�iciently in producing value for the buyer  
The parties in the example are risk neutral and agree to trade a good 
that is used in the buyer’s business. The seller’s investment in producing the 
good affects the value the buyer would derive from it, and the parties’ 
contracting problem is to induce the seller to invest ef�iciently in creating 
value for the buyer. In the example, the world has changed so that the initial 
statutory default no longer is an apt solution.59 We ask how parties respond 
to the lack of outside help. 
In the example, the good’s value to the buyer is a function of the level 
of the seller’s investment, i.e., the greater the investment, the greater the 
                                                                                                                                                    
 58. The example is drawn from a formal model that explains how the costs of writing 
contracts and the costs of renegotiating them constrain parties' ability to create contracts that 
induce parties to invest ef�iciently in their transactions. See Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, The 
Law and Economics of Costly Contracting, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 2, 10–16 (2004). 
 59. The parties’ problem in the example is to provide a price for the seller’s good that 
motivates the seller to invest in enhancing the buyer’s value. In this case, the obsolete default 
that would apply if the parties left the price term open is U.C.C. § 2–305(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. 
L. COMM’N 1952) (specifying a “reasonable price at the time for delivery”). See infra text 
accompanying note 70. 
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good’s value, and a stochastic-state variable, i.e., the world could turn out to 
be good for the buyer (e.g., demand for the �inal product is high) or bad for 
the buyer (demand is low). The seller invests ef�iciently when she optimally 
trades off increases in value against increases in investment cost. 
We let kβ be the parties equally shared cost of creating a contractual 
response to the obsolete UCC section. The variable β represents the 
minimum positive contracting cost and k can vary from zero to in�inity. 
Hence, contracting is costless when k = 0 and low when k = 1. Our 
assumption that the state created a default because an ef�icient contractual 
solution to the pricing problem was too costly for particular contracting 
parties to reach on their own implies that the more effective a private 
contractual response is in inducing the seller to invest ef�iciently, the higher 
is k: more ef�icient incentives are more costly to create. 
b. The effects of renegotiation 
Because it would be in�initely costly to write a contract term that is 
ef�icient in the in�inite number of future states that can occur, every feasible 
contract could sometimes turn out to be inapt. In these cases, parties 
renegotiate to a contract that induces them to trade when trade would be 
ef�icient, but not to trade otherwise. Renegotiation is costly for parties 
because it includes the time spent (and foregone) in developing the 
currently ef�icient solution and the cost of creating a modi�ied contract. 
These costs will exhaust (1 – x) percent of the renegotiation gain: 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. 
When x = 1, renegotiation is costless; and when x = 0, renegotiation costs 
erase the full gain.60 
c. The seller chooses either high or low investment level 
 The seller can choose a high investment level—eH—or a low 
investment level—eL. Because the buyer’s value is a joint function of the 
seller’s investment level and the state of the world, either level could be 
ef�icient in the circumstances.61 If the seller chooses the high investment 
level, she incurs a cost of 25. This cost, together with the realized state of 
the world, generates a value of 100 for the buyer with one-half probability; 
a value of 30 with one-fourth probability; and a value of 0 with one-fourth 
probability. If the seller chooses the low investment level, at a cost 
normalized to 0, the buyer’s value is 30 with three-fourths probability and 
0 with one-fourth probability. High investment therefore makes higher 
values more likely to occur and it turns out to be ef�icient in our example: 
                                                                                                                                                    
 60. As an example, assume the parties’ contract directs a result that would yield them a 
gain of 50 but ex post the parties realize that there is a contract to which they could 
renegotiate that would produce a gain of 80. If x = .6, renegotiation costs exhaust 40% of the 
renegotiation gain so the parties would net (.6)30 = 18. 
 61. We rule out a contract which provides that if the seller fails to make the ef�icient 
choice, she is �ined $10 million, for two reasons. First, contractual penalties are unenforceable; 
second, we assume that the buyer can observe the �inished product but not the seller’s 
behavior, so the buyer could not enforce a penalty term were one even enforceable. 
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eH: Net contractual gain (expected buyer value produced less seller’s 
cost): ½(100) + ¼(30) + ¼(0) – 25 = 32.5 
eL: Net contractual gain: ¾(30) + ¼(0) = 22.5. 
3. The Three Possible Responses to the Obsolete State-Supplied Term 
In the absence of an apt default rule that would solve the investment 
problem, parties would choose among three alternative contracts: (i) a 
simple contract that fails to motivate investment; (ii) a more costly 
“substitute contract” that motivates investment in some states but not 
others; and (iii) a �irst-best contract that ef�iciently solves the current 
version of the contracting problem but is even more costly to develop. 
 
a. The simple contract 
We begin with the least costly contract—the “simple contract”—the 
parties can make.62 We normalize the cost to create the simple contract to 
zero. Under this contract, the buyer pays a base price p in return for the 
good and the parties share equally in whatever value the seller’s investment 
produces.63 This contract does not attempt to affect the seller’s behavior 
and so, unsurprisingly, would not induce the seller to choose the ef�icient 
high investment level. 
eH: Seller’s net gain: ½(p + 100/2) + ¼(p + 30/2) + ¼(p) –25 = p + 3.75 
eL: Seller’s net gain: ¾(p + 30/2) + ¼(p) – 0 = p + 11.25. 64 
The seller’s net gain is higher when she invests inef�iciently. 
This simple story illustrates two points. First, the seller will not invest 
ef�iciently unless the contract attempts directly to in�luence her behavior. 
Second, any contract that does that will be more costly to create than the 
simple contract. 
b. The second-best “substitute” contract 
We next illustrate a second response—the “substitute contract”— 
under which the parties attempt to design at least a partial solution to the 
problem by specifying that the price the buyer pays will be a function of the 
                                                                                                                                                    
 62. We now are interested in whether the seller can be induced to invest ef�iciently, so 
we calculate her gain under the various contracts we consider. 
 63. The seller’s investment creates value for the buyer, but the seller will not invest 
unless the buyer shares. We assume an equal split for convenience. 
 64. When the seller chooses the high investment level—the �irst Expression—there is a 
one-half probability that the buyer pays p and the parties split the high value (the �irst term); 
a one-fourth probability that the buyer pays p and the parties split the low value (the second 
term); and a �inal one-fourth probability that the buyer pays p but no value is produced (the 
third term). The last term (25) is the seller’s investment cost. Thus, the expected return to the 
seller is price plus 3.75. When the seller chooses the low investment level—the second 
Expression—there is a three-fourths probability that the buyer pays p with the parties 
splitting the low value (the �irst term), and a one-fourth probability that the buyer pays p but 
there is no value created (the second term). Thus, the expected return to the seller is price 
plus 11.25. 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3788595
24   
value the seller produces. The question under the substitute contract is 
whether the seller will always choose the ef�icient high investment level in 
order to receive the higher price. 
The substitute contract provides that the parties trade the good and the 
buyer pays the price p if value is high (100); otherwise, the parties agree not 
to trade and the buyer pays a lower base price p’ (perhaps in the form of a 
nonrefundable deposit). When value turns out to be 30, however, the 
parties will renegotiate to permit them to trade in order to capture this 
positive value, but when value is 0 they allow the no trade agreement to 
stand. The contracting cost β is positive but low (i.e., k = 1) and the 
renegotiation cost also is positive and so reduces the renegotiation gain by 
(1 – x) percent. Under this contract: 
eH: Seller’s net gain: ½(p) + ¼(p’ + x(30/2)) + ¼(p’) – 25 = ½(p + p’) + 
x(3.75) –25 
eL: Seller’s net gain: ¾(p’ + x(30/2)) + ¼(p’) = p’ + x(11.25) 
When the seller chooses the high investment level, with one-half 
probability the value is high and the buyer pays the price p, capturing the 
value of 100. With one-fourth probability, the value is low so the parties 
renegotiate to trade at the base price p’ and the seller retains her share of 
the renegotiation gain (30/2) that renegotiation costs do not exhaust. 
Finally, with one-fourth probability there is no trade but the buyer pays p’. 
When the seller chooses the low investment level, the parties let the no 
trade directive stand when value is zero but renegotiate to trade when value 
is 30. The seller then receives the low price and realizes half the 30 
renegotiation gain again reduced by renegotiation costs. 
Comparing the gains from high and low investment, the seller chooses 
the high investment level if ½(p – p’) – x(7.5) > 25. 65 The left-hand side of 
this Expression is the seller’s marginal gain from a high investment. The 
right-hand side of the Expression is the marginal cost of choosing the high 
investment level. 
Regarding the �irst left-hand side term, the greater is the difference 
between the high price p and the low price p’, the stronger is the seller’s 
incentive to choose the high investment level. Regarding the negative 
second term, when the seller chooses the high investment level, the parties 
renegotiate with a one-fourth probability and the seller’s expected share of 
                                                                                                                                                    
 65. This expression is derived by comparing the seller’s net gain in the high investment 
(eH) scenario with her net gain in the low investment (eL) scenario. The seller will choose the 
high investment scenario if seller’s net gain (eH) > seller’s net gain (eL). Expressed 
arithmetically, this is represented as: ½(p + p’) + x(3.75) – 25 > p’ + x(11.25). By rearranging 
the variables on the two sides of the expression, we get: 
= ½(p + p’) + x(3.75) – 25 +25 > p’ + x(11.25) +25 (add 25 on both sides) 
= ½(p + p’) + x(3.75) – x(11.25) – p’ > p’ – p’ + x(11.25) – x(11.25) + 25 (subtract x(11.25) and 
p’ from both sides) 
= ½p – ½p’ – x(7.5) > 25 (factor out the ½ on the right side) 
= ½(p – p’) – x(7.5) > 25 
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the 30 renegotiation gain—1/4(30/2)—is x(3.75). In contrast, when the 
seller chooses the low investment level, the parties renegotiate with a three-
fourths probability so the seller’s share of the 30 gain is x(11.25). Thus, 
when the seller invests high she foregoes x(7.5) from renegotiation—the 
difference between the renegotiation returns under the two investment 
levels. This opportunity cost loss must be deducted from the seller’s gain in 
the price term to calculate the seller’s net return from high investment. Note 
that as the renegotiation cost increases (i.e., x becomes smaller), 
renegotiation becomes less attractive: That is, the marginally higher return 
from renegotiation when the seller invests low becomes attenuated. Indeed, 
when x = 0, there would be no renegotiation gain so the seller’s incentive to 
invest high would be maximized. 
The parties contract design task, then, is to choose the two prices such 
that the buyer prefers trade at the higher price p only when value is high, 
but otherwise prefers to trade at the lower price p’. This preference creates 
an incentive for the seller to invest high. Saving the reader a little arithmetic, 
the optimal difference between the two prices is 100(1– x/2).66 Substituting 
this value for p – p’ in the inequality above, the seller will choose the high 
investment level if the renegotiation cost parameter x ≤ .77. To clarify this 
fraction, if the seller chooses the high investment level, there is a possibility 
that value will be high, and the seller then receives the high price reduced 
by the investment cost. If the seller chooses the low investment level, value 
cannot be high but could be positive. If so, the seller would receive the low 
price plus a share of the low value reduced by the renegotiation cost. The 
greater is the renegotiation cost, the less attractive the low investment 
choice becomes. In the example, if the renegotiation cost would exhaust less 
than 23% of any renegotiation gain, the seller would do better choosing the 
low investment level.67 The substitute contract is thus a second-best 
solution to the contracting problem because in many states of the world it 
could not motivate the seller to choose the ef�icient high investment level. 
c. The �irst best: an ef�icient contract 
The parties’ third contracting choice is to attempt to motivate the seller 
to always choose the high investment level by creating the �irst best—an 
ef�icient contract term to replace the obsolete default. The �irst-best term 
solves the current version of the parties’ contracting problem as it exists 
today. This term, however, is the most expensive to create because it must 
replace the publicly supplied term that the state supplied when it was too 
                                                                                                                                                    
 66. For technical readers, in order to induce the buyer to prefer to pay p rather than 
reject trade, pay p’ and renegotiate to share surplus when value turns out to be high, the prices 
must satisfy the constraint 100 – p ≥ – p’ + 100x/2. To induce the buyer to renegotiate when 
v = 30 and let the no trade result stand when v = 0, the prices also must satisfy 30 – p ≤ –p’ 
+30x/2 and 0 – p + 30x/2 ≤ p’. Rearranging these inequalities yields 30(1 – x/2) ≤ p – p’ ≤ 
100(1 – x/2). 
 67. Parties sometimes would like to raise renegotiation costs but there are legal 
constraints. For example, banning renegotiation effectively makes renegotiation costs in�inite, 
but courts will not enforce no-renegotiation clauses. See infra Section III.B.1. 
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costly for private parties to create their own solution. The contracting cost 
to design the ef�icient contract now is kβ, with k > 1.68 The parties’ joint gain 
under the �irst-best contract is: 
½(100) + ¼(30) + ¼(0) – 25 – kβ = 32.5 – kβ 
The last two left-hand side terms are the investment cost and the 
contracting cost. 
In contrast, the parties’ joint gain under the substitute contract, with x 
≤ .77, is: 
½(100) + ¼(.77)30)) + ¼(0) – 25 – β = 30.8 – β. 
Comparing the parties’ returns under the �irst best, the ef�icient 
contract, and under the second-best, the substitute contract, the parties will 
choose the ef�icient contract if 1.7 > kβ – β.69 The term on the left-hand side 
is the marginal gain (above the gain from the substitute contract) from the 
�irst-best solution; the right-hand side is the marginal contracting cost. To 
get a feel for how the parties will choose between these two alternatives, let 
β = 1, the lowest possible basic contracting cost. Then, if k is greater than 2.7, 
the parties would not create the ef�icient solution to their contracting 
problem. But if k—the private multiplier—is less than 2.7, solving the 
contracting problem would be relatively cheap: In that case, there likely 
would not have been a need for a publicly supplied default initially.70 
4. The Effects of Obsolete State-Supplied Terms on Commercial 
Contracting 
To see the effect on commercial contracting this example suggests, 
suppose that when the UCC (or Restatement) was created the drafters 
                                                                                                                                                    
 68. Note that k includes both the cost of writing a contract and the cost of devising a 
solution to the contracting problem. Because it is more dif�icult to create more ef�icient 
solutions, we suppose that k is highest when parties attempt to achieve the �irst-best term. 
 69. The parties would choose to write the �irst-best contract if their joint gains are 
greater than the joint gains under the substitute contract. Expressed arithmetically, this is 
represented as 32.5 – kβ > 30.8 – β. By rearranging the variables on the two sides of the 
expression, we get: 
= 32.5 – 30.8 – kβ > 30.8 – 30.8 – β (subtract 30.8 from both sides) 
= 1.7 –kβ +kβ > – β + kβ (add kβ on both sides) 
= 1.7 > kβ – β 
 70. For an illustration of why creating an apt solution to the contracting problem to 
replace an obsolete default rule is typically too costly for any individual dyad, consider the 
options available to the parties in the Example. The simple contract pays the seller a �ixed 
price, which fails to motivate the seller to invest in efforts that increase the value of the good 
to the buyer. The second-best substitute contract speci�ies a higher price if the value turns out 
to be high and a base price (perhaps in the form of a nonrefundable deposit) if value turns out 
to be low. But given different levels of renegotiation and contracting cost, the substitute 
contract will also fail to motivate ef�icient investment in many circumstances. The �irst-best 
solution requires the development of dynamic price terms that induce the seller to invest 
ef�iciently in all world states. Such a complex pricing term would create value for all parties, 
but individual dyads are nonetheless likely to opt instead for the simple or substitute contract 
because they would bear the development costs of solving the contracting problem but could 
not capture the gains from competitors’ use of the innovative term. 
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observed that private parties were making contracts that left the price term 
open to be agreed upon at a later time. The drafters would infer that the 
contracting cost of specifying a solution to the problem of writing �lexible 
price contracts was too high (i.e., the private multiplier k was greater than 
2.7 in our example). The drafters, we assume, responded by creating the 
then ef�icient default: thus, UCC § 2–305(1) provides that if the price is not 
settled and parties subsequently fail to agree, the price is “a reasonable 
price at the time for delivery.”71 Now turn to today, when the contracting 
problem persists in a new form, but the statutory solution no longer is apt. 
If the contracting technology is unchanged, it would continue to be too 
costly for private parties to create the �irst-best solution (i.e., k would 
continue to exceed 2.7). The costs of writing an ef�icient contract today are 
high because individual parties would bear the entire costs of promulgating 
a widely successful solution to the contracting problem but could reap only 
a fraction of the bene�its from a �irst-best innovation.72 Thus, had the 
drafters remained current, they would again observe parties apparently not 
contracting to replace the obsolete default with a �irst-best price term. 
Rather, parties would be adjusting by adopting second-best solutions: 
writing substitute contracts or simple contracts that avoided addressing the 
contractual problem directly. In short, if the drafters’ role had not changed, 
they would now update the UCC or the Restatement accordingly. 
In the absence of updating, therefore, the obsolete default persists: It 
will not be replaced by an apt term designed by private parties and yet 
parties also will not have access to an ef�icient state-supplied default rule. 
What are the likely costs of persistent obsolescence? Parties must now 
choose between their second-best responses. The substitute contract would 
be the parties’ best choice if the net gain it produces would exceed the gain 
the simple contract would produce: that is, if 30.8– β > 11.25, or if β < 19.55. 
But if renegotiation costs fall or the minimum positive contracting cost 
increases, the simple contract would be the parties’ best response, and 
under it the seller would certainly choose the less ef�icient investment level. 
In sum, the example suggests that when state-supplied default terms 
                                                                                                                                                    
 71. U.C.C. § 2–305(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1952) 
 72. There are several barriers to innovation that deter parties from devising a �irst-best 
solution to the contracting problem. The limits of copyright and patent law create an initial 
barrier to innovation by denying contracting parties substantial property rights in devising 
new terms to solve new problems. An inherent free rider problem thus retards the production 
of costly innovative solutions to new problems. To be sure, there are incentives to innovate— 
repeat players can amortize costs over many transactions and drafting attorneys may enjoy 
reputational bene�its—but ultimately these are unlikely to offset the high development costs. 
In addition, the dif�iculty in coordinating with others a move to the new contractual language 
constitutes another barrier to party-designed default rules. And perhaps most importantly, 
the state’s monopoly on the of�icial recognition of the meaning of the new terms imposes a 
risk of error on any private efforts to innovate. Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice, 
supra note 9, at 293. 
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become obsolete, contracting parties would either make simple inef�icient 
contracts or make complex and possibly inef�icient substitutes.73 
These would be the parties’ actual responses if they reject two other 
possibilities. First, parties would not make a contract that accepted the 
obsolete default because the simple contract is less risky. The two contracts 
are identical in two respects: (a) The contracting cost would be the same 
because accepting an obsolete default is costless, as is creating the simple 
contract; and (b) neither contract can induce ef�icient investment: The 
simple contract does not try, and an inapt default cannot solve the parties’ 
contracting problem in its current version. Accepting the default is riskier 
than switching to the simple contract, however, because an inapt default 
may be linguistically applicable to the current version of the problem. A 
party may attempt to exploit this applicability to capture wealth from its 
counterparty.74 Because the simple contract does not raise a strategic 
behavior risk, parties would prefer the simple contract to a contract with 
the inapt default. 
Contracting parties also would prefer the simple contract to a contract 
with the inapt default expressly disclaimed. Such a modi�ied contract would 
contain a gap. This would have two disadvantages. Because there is a gap, a 
party dissatis�ied with how a deal turns out would have an incentive to 
litigate in order to get a court to create a rule in its favor. In addition, parties 
could not predict what a judicial rule would be. The simple contract has no 
gap: Parties share equally whatever value the seller produces. Thus, there 
is litigation risk under either a contract that retains the obsolete default or 
a similar contract that deletes it, but no litigation risk under the simple 
contract. 
This analysis reinforces the conclusion that, facing an obsolete default 
term, contracting parties would decide to make either the simple contract 
or the substitute contract. As a consequence, few if any UCC or Restatement 
defaults that became obsolete would be simply useless or vestigial. Parties 
would contract away from them to one of the two alternative contracts we 
analyzed, and the default would remain as a black letter rule, offering only 
an ostensible solution to the contracting problem. 
Parties would respond similarly to an obsolete Q/M rule. Since, by 
hypothesis, the conditions that justi�ied limiting parties’ freedom to bargain 
directly for the Q/M term no longer obtain, the justi�ication for imposing 
higher costs on parties seeking to solve their contracting problem indirectly 
would disappear. Parties would continue to write either simple or 
substitute contracts that offered indirect means of solving their contractual 
                                                                                                                                                    
 73. Observers have remarked that American contracts are becoming increasingly 
complex. See, e.g., Cathy Hwang & Matthew Jennejohn, The New Research on Contractual 
Complexity, 14 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 381, 382–92 (2019) (reviewing the literature on modular and 
integrated contract designs). Our result that obsolescence induces parties to write more 
complex contracts is consistent with this phenomenon. 
 74. This, of course, is exactly what happened in the litigation over the meaning of the 
pari passu clause in sovereign bonds. See discussion in supra note 11; see also infra Part III.C. 
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problem. But since the justi�ication for erecting barriers to contracting out 
have disappeared, the cost of escaping the obsolete Q/M rule is a 
deadweight loss. 
C. Obsolescence in Interdependent Private Contracts 
It is widely assumed that contracts between private parties do not 
contain obsolete terms. If a term in a prior contract becomes inapt, parties 
will not include the term in their current contract. This view implicitly 
assumes, however, that parties’ contracting choices are not affected by the 
choices of other market actors. This assumption does not hold, however, in 
certain large multilateral markets where parties trade using standardized 
contract terms. Here, contracting parties will retain obsolete terms in their 
current contract if the market would punish the supplier of a new or revised 
term. In such cases, innovation requires the potential innovator to 
coordinate with other market actors on a new term. We illustrate this 
phenomenon with an analysis of sovereign bond contracts, where a state 
may continue to issue bonds that contain an obsolete term despite the 
danger of strategic behavior it presents. 
1. An Example: The Sovereign Bond Market 
In our analysis, the agents are sovereign states {s1, s2, s3, . . . S} that play 
a coordination game in connection with issuing bonds. The buyers are 
symmetric: They have the same incentive, which is to purchase bonds they 
can sell on the secondary market. A bond contract consists of a set of terms 
that de�ine the relationship between the buyer and the issuing state. The 
terms regulate default, specify a payment schedule, and settle other matters. 
Because bond issuances are largely routine, a contract issued today will be 
similar to the contract issued yesterday. The interest rate is current but 
many terms will have become boilerplate over time. Parties do not negotiate 
the non-payment terms.75 Rather, bond contracts are offered to the market 
on a take it or leave it basis. However, states sometimes renegotiate with 
bondholders if circumstances materially change after issuance (e.g., the 
sovereign has dif�iculty paying). Importantly, we assume that boilerplate 
terms differ little across the bond issuances of different sovereign states. 
A market for sovereign bonds is formed around the economic 
comparability of the issuing states. Consider, for example, two sovereign 
states: Panama and the U.S. Both issue debt but otherwise are dissimilar. 
Bond buyers, we assume, consider Panama to be in a class with other small, 
risky countries. Thus, we model the bond issuing game as a set of moves by 
state Si and a set of moves by “everyone else” in the same class, but because 
the set of comparable states is relatively small, we let S ....i stand in for the 
market (formally, the players are Si, S ....i). We assume that every country in 
the same class offers a bond at the beginning of a market period. Buyers 
                                                                                                                                                    
 75. MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE 3½ MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE 
LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 24–30 (2013). 
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enter the market to decide which country’s bond to purchase. But now a set 
of terms in the bond contracts that were issued in the last period have 
become obsolete. 
Before analyzing the parties’ possible responses to obsolescence in 
boilerplate, we note two differences between the private contract context 
and the obsolete state-supplied default context. First, parties to sovereign 
bond contracts do not attempt to in�luence the state’s behavior (i.e., to be 
more �iscally prudent or to repay promptly). The bonds only regulate 
payment and default.76 The possibility of renegotiation may in�luence 
behavior ex post but this is apart from the terms of the bond contract. 
Second, in the example developed in Part II.B, we assumed that it was costly 
to create a contract but costless to read one. Here, we assume that bond 
contracts are suf�iciently complex that mastering what the contract says is 
a capital investment that is amortized over future bond purchases. A state 
that does not change the bond contract is thus offering a cheaper bond—
one that costs less for borrowers to understand—than a bond with different 
terms: A different contract would require a new capital investment. Finally, 
we assume that, given the size of the bond market, there is no prior 
communication among the issuing states. 
2. A Coordination Game with Three Possible Strategies 
The three strategies available to a sovereign—the three types of bond 
contracts a state can issue today—are to (1) use the previous contract again 
despite the obsolete terms (“O”); (2) substitute different but more ef�icient 
contract terms than the obsolete contract (“S”); and (3) innovate by creating 
a �irst-best contract (“I”). The market “coordinates” if states Si and S ....i issue 
the same contract: the market contract is the coordinated contract. Under 
coordination, each state’s payoff under any of the contracts is (assumed to 
be) positive. The lowest positive payoff is (O,O)—issuing debt under the 
previous obsolete contract. The payoff is positive because the contract is 
familiar to buyers despite the danger that the obsolete term may morph into 
a litigation risk (i.e., it does not require a capital investment to understand). 
The payoff is greater if Si and S ....i both issue debt under the substitute bond 
contract (S/S). As explained above, a substitute contract generates a higher 
return than the obsolete contract. The highest payoff is realized when states 
coordinate on the �irst-best innovative contract because it is the ef�icient 
contract and so should sell on the best terms. 
It is costly, however, for a sovereign state to deviate from the market 
contract, whatever that contract may be. The buyers are reluctant to 
purchase a different contract because the buyers subsequently market 
bonds to individual investors, pension funds, and the like. Either these 
agents will not purchase the different contract because the contract is costly 
for them to understand (and the deviation may re�lect relevant conditions 
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in the issuing state that the buyers cannot access), or the buyers will 
purchase the deviant contract only if it came with an above market interest 
rate. 77 In short, the more different a bond is from the market contract, the 
less liquid it is. 
We represent the game as follows. 
                                  S....i 
 
                      O                               S                  I 
      
  O
 Si S 
         I
                  
The S....i player is the column player; its payoffs are after the commas. The Si 
player—our illustrative issuing state—is the row player; its payoffs are 
before the commas. There are three equilibria in this game: the states play 
O/O; play S/S; or play I/I. Consider S....i: it can insure itself a positive payoff 
of 1 by choosing O no matter what Si does. Similarly, Si can insure itself a 
positive payoff of 1 no matter what S....i does. Next, notice that I/I is the 
pareto superior equilibrium, generating the highest joint payoff of 6. If Si 
believes that S....i is rational, wants to maximize its payoff, and understands 
the game, Si will believe that S....i will play I. Similarly, if S....i has the same 
beliefs about Si, it will believe that Si also will play I. Thus, I/I—everyone 
uses the most innovative, ef�icient bond contract—seems the most 
reasonable equilibrium. 
3. The Equilibrium Strategy: Retain the Obsolete Term 
The rationality and competence assumptions we just made do not 
always hold, however. States that issue sovereign bonds, particularly 
developing states, sometimes exhibit pathologies of goal selection and 
�inancial and administrative abilities.78 For this reason, individual states 
may be reluctant to assume that other states will rationally and competently 
invest in costly innovation to create the most ef�icient contract.79 Notice 
                                                                                                                                                    
77 Id at 34-35. 
78 Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 11 at 47-52. 
 79. The joint value-maximizing move is for the states collectively to coordinate on a new 
term that solves the contracting problem. But each individual state’s belief in what others will 
do is in�luenced by the knowledge that a decision to innovate by itself means bearing all the 
risks of change (i.e., experiencing a negative payoff if others chose not to innovate), while not 
capturing all the bene�its. This inertia is exacerbated in the sovereign debt context because of 
a substantial agency problem. The debt managers who issue the bonds on behalf of the 
sovereign state do not regard the contract terms as relevant to the initial pricing of their bonds 
because they know that the investment banks charged with marketing the bonds only care 
about having the standard terms. The debt mangers are af�irmatively discouraged from 
making innovative deviations from the standard terms because nonstandard terms make the 
1,1 1,–1 1,–2 
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now that if Si plays I (i.e., innovates), it receives the highest negative payoff 
(–2) if S....i chooses O or S. Doubt among states about the capacities of other 
states to design and issue ef�icient bonds thus implies that I/I no longer is 
the most likely equilibrium: Both players will want to avoid the high 
negative payoff that would result from being the only state to issue the most 
costly, though ef�icient, contract to the market.80 
The other possible equilibria are S/S or O/O. A player who rejects the 
assumptions of rationality and competence on the part of other players 
would assign a 50% probability to the other states playing either 
equilibrium. On this assumption, the illustrative state would choose O 
because it would have a higher expected payoff.81 Therefore, the reasonable 
equilibrium in this market is O/O. Every state will issue bonds under 
contracts that retain obsolete terms. 
4. Summary: Coordination Impediments Result in Inertia 
To summarize, there is a plausible explanation for the persistence of 
obsolescence in sovereign bond and other similar contracts. As we later 
show, our result for sovereign bonds also applies to some markets for 
corporate bonds. Continuing to use a contract with obsolete terms would be 
an inexplicable response when contracting parties are autarkic but may be 
a possible best response when parties are interdependent and unable to 
coordinate readily. Thus, when contracts are standardized across a large 
market, a party’s best response to its strategic situation may be to choose 
not to amend the terms of a sovereign or corporate bond contract even 
though the obsolete terms may generate mistaken judicial 
interpretations.82 
This explanation for the persistence of quasi-mandatory boilerplate in 
standardized, interdependent contracts points to a normative solution. The 
doubts we assume that players in the game have about each other’s 
responses to efforts to update obsolete terms may be avoided by 
communication among the players. The policy implication, therefore, is that 
                                                                                                                                                    
initial issuance of the bonds more costly and dif�icult to market. Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati & 
Jeromin Zettelmeyer, If Boilerplate Could Talk: The Work of Standard Terms in Sovereign Bond 
Contracts, 44 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 617, 644 (2019) (“The fact that a term is perceived to be 
standard . . . conveys stability, continuity, and conformity to market norms, which in turn are 
conducive to market liquidity.”). See also Choi, Gulati & Scott, The Black Hole Problem, supra 
note 11, at 52–54, 61–65 (describing how agency costs “pervade the sovereign bond market” 
and contribute to the persistence of obsolete standard terms). 
 80. In game theory terms, I/I is not a trembling hand perfect equilibrium. "Trembling-
hand perfectness is an equilibrium concept...according to which a strategy that is to be part of 
an equilibrium must continue to be optimal for the player even if there is a small chance that 
the other player will pick an out-of-equilibrium action (i.e., that the other player's hand will 
'tremble')." ERIC RASMUSSEN , GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY (2nd 
ed. 1994) at 145. 
 81. A state that did not know what other states would do would assign a 50% probability 
to others choosing O or S. In the assumed game, O would have a higher payoff. E(S) = .5(2) + 
.5(–1) = ½; O = 1. 
 82. We offer data in support of this explanation in Part III.C. 
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interventions to facilitate better communication among parties to 
interdependent contracts would be helpful.83 For example, in the case of 
sovereign debt contracting, an international agency that reviews bond 
contracts and announces ef�icient solutions would increase the ability of 
states and investors in the market to coordinate on an updated contract.84 
III. EVIDENCE OF THE PERSISTENCE AND COSTS OF OBSOLETE CONTRACT TERMS 
In this Part, we examine the evidence that supports the predictions in 
Part II that both state-supplied and interdependent contract terms become 
obsolete as conditions change and that obsolescence persists despite 
individual parties’ incentives to develop ef�icient solutions to contracting 
problems. Parts IIIA and IIIB marshal evidence showing how commercial 
parties reject the obsolete default and quasi-mandatory terms that 
lawmaking institutions produce in favor of less ef�icient simple or substitute 
contracts. Part IIIC summarizes data from current empirical investigations 
of both the sovereign bond and corporate bond markets showing that 
parties fail to revise obsolete boilerplate terms in interdependent contracts 
notwithstanding the signi�icant litigation risks the obsolete terms present. 
A. Obsolete State-Supplied Default Rules 
The theory developed in Part II predicts that parties will reject an 
obsolete default term because the term cannot solve the current version of 
their contracting problem and bad faith parties could exploit the term 
strategically. Moreover, parties are unlikely to create a �irst-best term 
equivalent to an apt state-supplied default.85 Instead, the theory predicts 
that parties will replace an obsolete term with one of two second-best 
alternatives: either a least cost, simple contract or a complex substitute 
contract that may not induce an ef�icient outcome. Both likely contracting 
responses are sub-optimal relative to a state-supplied default term that 
solves the current contracting problem. The examples below from UCC and 
                                                                                                                                                    
 83. In some markets, coordination on updating contract terms is achieved through well-
organized trade associations. See infra note 184 and accompanying text. But effective 
communication becomes increasingly more dif�icult as the size of market under consideration 
expands. States need to contend with language barriers, cultural and institutional 
discrepancies, and informational asymmetries. Poor communication in turn negatively affects 
coordination. See Timothy N. Cason, Roman M. Sheremeta & Jingjing Zhang, Communication 
and Ef�iciency in Competitive Coordination Games, 76 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 26, 27 (2012) 
(summarizing research that explains how increasing communication in coordination games 
can reduce uncertainty about other parties’ strategic behavior and facilitate Pareto-enhancing 
outcomes). 
 84. We discuss in Part III.C the parties’ inability to communicate effectively in the 
sovereign bond market and the extended delay before parties were �inally able to update the 
obsolete terms in their contracts. 
 85. The cost of developing an apt default solution to an industry-wide contracting 
problem is greater than the bene�it of that solution for any individual dyad. Only by capturing 
rents from other parties use of the default would the development costs be justi�ied. While 
the other options produce smaller bene�its, their lower costs create net value. 
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Restatement rules support our theoretical claim that, when facing rules that 
have become obsolete, contemporary commercial parties reject the default 
and choose to substitute what appear to be second-best agreements. 
1. Consequential Damages 
The UCC and Restatement default rules governing recovery of 
consequential damages exemplify obsolete terms that commercial parties 
routinely disclaim. The terms require the seller to deliver conforming goods 
or pay the buyer damages, including consequential damages. These 
damages are measured as the difference between the value to the buyer of 
accepted goods and the value the buyer would have derived from 
conforming goods.86 Early common law cases held that a buyer could not 
recover consequential damages unless there existed a tacit agreement 
between the parties regarding the particular consequences that could affect 
the buyer’s valuation.87 The Restatement and the UCC replaced the tacit 
agreement test with a softer standard: The seller is liable if she had “reason 
to know” what the buyer’s consequential loss would be. Otherwise, the 
drafters believed, buyers would too readily be denied full compensation.88 
But with the advent of the technology revolution and just-in-time methods 
of procurement, actual and hypothetical valuations are very dif�icult to 
verify. Buyers today attempt to exploit this uncertainty by overstating their 
valuations. 
The “reason to know” standard for recovering consequential damages 
thus is obsolete: It requires sellers to insure buyers’ valuations when the 
sellers do not know how much insurance to sell. Because buyers know their 
valuations, they usually are better risk bearers. As a result, commercial 
parties today routinely opt out of the consequential damages default rule. 
In its place, parties create complex repair-and-replacement provisions that 
allocate the risks of product defects in other ways.89 But the repair and 
replacement clause is less ef�icient than an apt risk allocation clause that the 
                                                                                                                                                    
 86. U.C.C. § 2–714 (2)–(3) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1952) (“The measure of 
damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance between 
the value of the good accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as 
warranted . . . In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under [§ 2–715] 
may also be recovered.”). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 351 (AM. L. INST. 
1979). 
 87. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854) (“If the special circumstances 
under which the contract was actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the 
defendants . . . the damages resulting from the breach . . . would be the amount of injury which 
would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these special circumstances so 
known and communicated.”). 
 88. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2–715(2)(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1952); id. cmt 2 (“The 
‘tacit agreement’ test . . . is rejected.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(2)(b) (AM. 
LAW INST. 1979). 
 89. For discussion, see Schwartz & Scott, The Default Rule Project, supra note 13. A repair 
and replacement clause obligates the seller, in contractually de�ined cases, to repair or replace 
defective parts of products within a contractually de�ined time. The seller otherwise does not 
bear any risk. 
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state could provide: Negotiating and drafting the substitute contract is 
costly, and yet, by shifting the entire burden of consequential damages to 
the buyer, the repair and replacement clause allocates some risks to buyers 
that that an apt default would otherwise allocate to sellers. 
2. Implied Warranties 
The UCC primarily regulates quality issues with the implied warranty 
of merchantability: Goods must be “�it for the ordinary purposes for which 
they are used” or “pass without objection in the trade.”90 This regulation 
was once ef�icient when sellers traded homogenous standard goods to large 
numbers of similarly situated buyers. In this context, the sellers were better 
informed about product quality than the buyers. Thus, it was ef�icient for 
the sellers to warrant that all of the items in a lot were identical and did 
what goods of that type were supposed to do. However, the implied 
warranty term is a candidate for obsolescence because the commercial 
pattern within which the term was once ef�icient is no longer prevalent. 
Today, two �irms sometimes jointly develop the speci�ications for a product, 
and then seller and buyer agents together install the product in the buyer’s 
plant.91 Both parties thus are (approximately) equally informed about the 
product’s characteristics. The UCC warranty that a merchant seller 
guarantees that its goods “would pass without objection in the trade” thus 
presupposes a commercial pattern into which the jointly created and 
installed product sale does not �it. If the buyer later raises a quality 
objection, it could not (or should not) prevail by attempting to show that 
“the trade” would reject the seller’s performance: The transaction is 
individuated so there is no trade. 
The UCC implied warranty of quality reduces parties’ expected 
contractual surplus when parties create products jointly. Because the term 
is inapt, its presence as a default creates uncertainty; parties cannot easily 
predict how a court would apply the term to disputes in their case. Further, 
because the term could not be straightforwardly applied, litigation costs— 
deciding what evidence to introduce or contest and how to argue the “law” 
—would be high. In practice, therefore, the UCC implied warranty is 
commonly disclaimed. Its negative contribution is not limited to the costs of 
contracting out, however. As the theory of obsolescence developed in Part 
II predicts, parties do not engage the high-cost option of designing an apt 
replacement for the obsolete default. Rather, they write a lower-cost 
substitute contract by creating an express warranty that substitutes for the 
obsolete term.92 Then, by disclaiming the implied warranty, sellers shift to 
the buyer the risk of product defects other than those that the seller 
                                                                                                                                                    
 90. U.C. C § 2–314(2) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1952). 
 91. For discussion on how �irms work together to develop products, see Bernstein & 
Peterson, supra note 5, at 3–6. See also Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Contracting for Innovation, supra 
note 48, at 438–444 (2009) (describing the shift toward collaboration among several �irms to 
produce a product). 
 92. See U.C.C. § 2–213 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1952) (specifying the ways in which 
an express warranty is created). 
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expressly assumes. Writing an optimal express warranty term is costly, 
however, and thus sellers commonly offer a standard express warranty to 
all buyers. Because buyers today often have diverse procurement needs, the 
absence of individuation suggests that the warranty may create suboptimal 
incentives to invest or allocate risks optimally.93 
3. The Cure Rule 
The seller’s right to cure a defective tender is a further example of an 
obsolete UCC default rule. Under section 2–508(2), if a buyer properly 
rejects a non-conforming tender, but the seller “had reasonable grounds to 
believe [the tender] would be acceptable with or without a money 
allowance,” the seller has a “further reasonable time” to substitute 
conforming goods after the time for delivery speci�ied in the contract has 
passed.94 
This rule might once have been an apt solution to the problems of 
inadvertent errors by sellers and surprise rejections by buyers, but the 
solution assumes that buyers often could accept late deliveries. Many 
buyers had this ability in a commercial era during which buyers 
accumulated an inventory of parts and thus could more readily 
accommodate the disruption caused by the late delivery of ultimately 
conforming goods. But the rule is obsolete in the current environment 
where commercial parties routinely rely on “just-in-time” production and 
collaborative problem solving.95 Under contemporary production practices, 
when inventories are deliberately kept to a minimum, granting the seller 
the unilateral right to cure a defective tender is costly to a buyer who 
                                                                                                                                                    
 93. To clarify, parties may face a perennial contracting problem—to de�ine a seller’s 
quality obligation—in a new context or may face a new contracting problem. A term then is 
obsolete if it is an outmoded solution to the perennial problem or if parties (or a court) 
attempt to apply a term designed to solve a prior problem to the new problem. The implied 
warranty example above illustrates the former concern. The text for convenience primarily 
analyzes the outmoded, rather than the inapt, term, but both contribute negatively to 
expected surplus. 
 94. U.C.C. § 2–508(2) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1952). 
 95. In construction, contractually speci�ied information exchange regimes are now often 
used to facilitate coordination between the buyer and the suppliers during complex projects, 
and especially to register emergent problems and respond effectively to them. See, e.g., 
GEORGETOWN 19TH STREET DEVELOPMENT, LLC & TURNER CONSTRUCTION CO., AGREEMENT (Apr. 1, 
2003) (contracting for construction services). The Agreement provides: 
Throughout the Pre-Construction Services Phase and the Construction 
Services Phase of the Work, the Key Personnel, and the Construction 
Manager’s Trade Contractors shall meet at least once a week . . . with 
Owner and the Architect for the purpose of (i) reviewing the Work, or any 
component thereof, in respect of design, construction, costs incurred and 
to be incurred, and progress, and (ii) preparing a list (to the extent 
reasonably foreseeable) of decisions or actions which Owner must make 
or take within the next sixty (60) Days to avoid delays in completion of 
the Work, or any component thereof. 
Id. at art. 5.2. For a detailed account of how such mechanisms function in practice, see ATUL 
GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET THINGS RIGHT 54–71 (2009). 
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requires collaborative information exchange before delivery and a 
conforming delivery at the date speci�ied in the contract.96 
The theory of obsolescence predicts that parties will not create an 
ef�icient solution to the late delivery problem. Instead, and unsurprisingly, 
parties today use a simple “no replacement” clause.97 This opt out permits 
the buyer to insist on a perfect tender at the time for delivery.98 But this 
solution, too, is a blunt instrument, because it inhibits contractual �lexibility 
that might otherwise generate ef�icient outcomes: It may sometimes be ex 
post ef�icient to permit the seller to make prompt adjustments to an initial 
defective tender. The problem with the obsolete default and the opt out 
option that the Code invites the buyer to take is that both are almost as 
insensitive to the conditions of just-in-time production as was the original 
cure rule. 
B. Obsolete Quasi-Mandatory Rules99 
Commercial law rules can be  grouped into three categories: standard 
defaults, sticky defaults, and mandatory rules. But as previously noted, the 
distinction between sticky defaults and mandatory rules is more �luid than 
is commonly supposed. Parties often can realize the solution they prefer by 
costly contracting around the mandatory rule.100 For that reason, we have 
characterized rules that erect cost barriers to contracting out of the state-
supplied rules as quasi-mandatory (Q/M) rules. In this section, we illustrate 
obsolescence in Q/M rules with an analysis of (1) the rule in contracts that 
“no renegotiation” clauses are unenforceable; (2) the absolute priority rule 
in bankruptcy, which makes a voluntary change of the priority order 
unenforceable; and (3) the reorganization rules in bankruptcy that prevent 
contractually mandated sales of an insolvent �irm to the market. In each of 
these cases, commercial patterns have changed such that the features that 
justi�ied the mandatory rule no longer apply. 
1. The Common Law Rule Denying Enforcement of “No Renegotiation” 
Clauses 
To understand this rule, assume parties agree today to trade a quantity 
of goods tomorrow for a price. Their choice of quantity and price would 
yield an ef�icient trade under the circumstances the parties believed were 
most likely to occur. But if demand in the buyer’s resale market fell so that 
                                                                                                                                                    
 96. GAWANDE, supra note 92, 54–71. 
 97. The option of opting out of the cure rule in favor of a “no replacement” clause is 
explicitly invited in U.C.C § 2–508, cmt. 2 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1952). 
 98. See U.C.C § 2–601 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1952) (outlining the buyer’s 
remedies when provided with non-conforming goods); id. § 2–508(2), cmt. 2 (“The seller is 
charged with commercial knowledge of any factors in a particular sales situation which 
require him to comply strictly with his obligations under the contract as, for example, strict 
conformity . . . .”). 
 99. Mandatory rules are ef�icient when they require parties to internalize a negative 
externality. We assume here that no externality exists. 
 100. See supra Section II.B.1. 
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the buyer no longer needed the speci�ied quantity of goods, the parties 
would be motivated to renegotiate to trade fewer goods, with a price 
adjustment or an adjustment in other aspects of their relationship. Suppose, 
however, that their contract contained a prohibition on renegotiation. The 
parties would then inef�iciently have to trade the contractual quantity of 
goods or attempt to make costly indirect adjustments to their deal.101 
The example shows that a no renegotiation clause would be inef�icient 
for this simple procurement transaction. Because it would be too costly for 
parties to create a contract that speci�ies prices and quantities for every 
possible ex post state, parties contract for the average state. As a 
consequence, parties expect to renegotiate in a nontrivial fraction of 
possible future states to escape a contract that has become inapt. A party 
would agree to a no renegotiation clause, courts thus believe, only if the 
party failed to understand the transaction or was misinformed about the 
volatility of market conditions. Refusing to enforce no renegotiation clauses 
thus provides parties with the deal that parties contracting under ideal 
conditions would make. 
But now consider a more contemporary case in which, as in the 
example in Part II, parties want to induce a seller to invest ef�iciently in the 
transaction. Because the buyer cannot observe the seller’s behavior, an 
ef�icient contract would put risk on the seller in order to induce ef�icient 
investment: The seller’s return is conditioned on the value she produces. 
The seller bears risk because that value is partly a function of her effort, but 
also a function of how the world turns out. In this variant of the investment 
example, suppose that the seller completes her investment before the state 
of the world is realized and is risk averse. There no longer is a need to 
motivate the seller but she bears risk nevertheless: The world may turn out 
to be unfavorable. Therefore, there is a possibly ef�icient renegotiation. If 
the buyer is risk neutral, the parties would agree to shift risk to the buyer in 
return for a �ixed payment to the seller that would lie somewhere between 
her contractual return from the low-value outcome and her return from the 
high-value outcome. If, however, the seller anticipates that she will 
ultimately be paid a �ixed sum that is independent of the actual outcome, 
she knows that she does not bear risk. Hence, she will not be motivated to 
invest ef�iciently.102 
In this example, renegotiation unravels the parties’ incentive scheme. 
To make that scheme effective, the parties therefore must contract to ban 
renegotiation. The Q/M rule that makes no renegotiation clauses 
unenforceable thus forces parties to use more costly and likely less ef�icient 
substitutes. And to summarize, the ban on no renegotiation clauses is 
                                                                                                                                                    
 101. If a party would bene�it from enforcing the original contract, it might attempt to 
exploit the no renegotiation term to extract rents. 
 102. This reasoning was originally developed in Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral 
Commitments: A New Perspective on Contractual Commitments, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 203 (1997). 
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obsolete for much of the modern economy, in which contracts not only 
regulate trade but also regulate behavior. 
2. The Absolute Priority Rule 
A �irm creates a priority order in its contracts with investors. The debt 
contract gives the investor a senior claim on �irm returns up to the face 
value of the debt and the right, bankruptcy aside, to control the �irm when 
it cannot pay. The equity contract gives investors the upside after the debt 
is paid and governance rights in solvency states. Bankruptcy courts respect 
the contractual priority order when the �irm is liquidated under Chapter 7: 
Creditors are paid �irst.103 
The absolute priority rule (AP) applies when a debtor attempts to 
reorganize under Chapter 11. For example, consider a �irm that has senior 
secured debt, junior unsecured debt, and equity. Suppose that the senior 
debt agrees to yield a share of its bankruptcy payoff to the equity in order 
to induce the current managers to run the �irm. Managerial continuity, in 
the senior’s view, would enhance the prospects of a successful 
reorganization. The deal, however, would alter the contractual priority 
order because the equity would receive value before the junior debt is paid 
in full. But the deal also would be a Pareto gain for the juniors: The payment 
to the equity would reduce the seniors’ monetary bankruptcy payoff but it 
would not reduce the junior’s bankruptcy payoff. And if the senior is right, 
the deal would increase the value of the junior debt by increasing the chance 
that the debtor will survive. Nevertheless, numerous appellate cases, and 
the Supreme Court three times, have refused to enforce deals between 
seniors and the equity, insisting instead that the juniors must be paid in 
full.104 AP thus is a Q/M rule that is the exact reverse of the no renegotiation 
rule in contracts: The contract rule permits parties to renegotiate in every 
case; AP prevents parties—the seniors and the equity—from renegotiating 
in any case. 105 
The courts have not articulated a clear rationale for AP but there is a 
probable reason. The rule received its strongest judicial endorsement in 
1939 in an opinion by Justice Douglas.106 The junior debt then usually was 
in the form of bonds held by individual investors. The Court apparently 
                                                                                                                                                    
 103. See Chapter 7 – Bankruptcy Basics, U. S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/services-
forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-7-bankruptcy-basics (last visited Oct. 13, 
2020). 
 104. See, e.g., Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 197–198 (1988) 
(holding that the AP rule bars a defaulting party from retaining an equity interest in a 
reorganization plan despite promises by the party to contribute future “labor, experience, and 
expertise”); Northern Paci�ic Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 502 (1913) (holding that 
agreements between bondholders and stockholders “cannot defeat the claim of a non-
assenting creditor”). 
 105. See Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Con�lict in Chapter 
11, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 513 (2009) (“[F]ew reorganization plans (at most 12 percent) 
deviate from the absolute priority rule by distributing value to equity holders. . . . In at least 
82 percent of the cases, equity holders received nothing.”). 
 106. Case v. L.A. Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939). 
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believed that senior/equity deals partly re�lected efforts by banks to 
preserve the social status and economic prospects of the debtor’s managers. 
The bondholders lacked the sophistication and the information to intervene 
when payments to the equity would not increase the odds of a successful 
reorganization. In addition, an individual bondholder probably could not 
internalize enough of the gain from such an intervention to contest an unfair 
senior/equity deal on behalf of the bondholders as a class. Hence, many 
deals would go unchallenged. The AP rule thus was thought to protect the 
junior bondholders by preventing the equity from receiving anything until 
the juniors were fully paid. 
The demographics of credit markets are different today. Individual 
investors hold stock, while bondholders usually are pension funds, 
insurance companies, and high net worth persons. Moreover, much junior 
debt in current bankruptcies is held by sophisticated investors, who buy out 
the trade debt and other small creditors and then attempt to in�luence the 
reorganization. 107 While the ideal conditions that justify free contracting 
may not have existed when the AP rule was created, those conditions do 
exist today. AP is thus an obsolete rule because modern bondholders are 
sophisticated and well-informed: Renegotiation in this context may produce 
more ef�icient outcomes. 
3. The Obsolete Reorganization Rules in Chapter 11 
A liquidity-constrained �irm that believes it can survive will �ile for 
reorganization under Chapter 11. In a traditional reorganization, the equity 
is eliminated and the �irm is sold to its creditors. Because the payment a 
creditor must make is jointly determined by the debtor’s value and the 
creditor’ priority order, the bankruptcy court must value the debtor. The 
court also must �ind that the debtor’s restructured business plan is feasible. 
During the course of reorganization, a �irm sometimes will shed 
unproductive assets through the vehicle of a sale under § 363 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which authorizes the debtor to sell assets “out of the 
ordinary course” with court approval. Traditional reorganizations are 
costly because valuation, business feasibility, and § 363 hearings take time 
and often require expert testimony. 
Today, a signi�icant fraction of Chapter 11 debtors are sold under § 363 
as entire �irms. 108 It is a dif�icult economic question whether to reorganize 
                                                                                                                                                    
 107. See STUART C. GILSON, CREATING VALUE THROUGH CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 188–90, 
192–96 (2001) (providing an overview of the distressed claims market and the various 
strategies employed by activist investors to generate value from reorganizations); Michelle 
M. Harner, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy Implications of Activist Distressed Debt 
Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 705–710 (2008) (describing how sophisticated investors 
can purchase large amounts of a company’s debt and exert control over the reorganization 
process). 
 108. See Stuart Gilson, Edith Hotckiss & Matthew Osborn, Cashing Out: The Rise of M&A in 
Bankruptcy 5–6 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 15–057, 2015) (�inding that out of a 
sample of 350 bankruptcy cases, 75 �irms or 21.4% of the overall sample were sold as entire 
�irms under § 363); Ayotte & Morrison, Creditor Control and Con�lict, supra note 102, at 521, 
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a particular debtor in the traditional way or to auction it off. 109 It is also a 
new question. The business sections of the Bankruptcy Code were created 
in 1978, when markets for entire �irms were primitive. Lawyers and 
investment bankers, beginning in the early 1980s, developed innovative 
techniques for �inancing acquisitions and merging assets. A market sale for 
one billion dollars was nonexistent in the 1970s, but sales in the tens of 
billions are seen today.110 The Code gives the court no guidance on how to 
conduct bankruptcy auctions. Section 363 requires the court, after a 
hearing, to approve a sale or not, but the section does not say what can be 
sold, when a sale can occur, or how a sale can be conducted. The section was 
enacted to regulate unusual sales of parts of �irms but is now used to 
regulate sales of entire �irms in a capital market that the drafters of the 
Bankruptcy Code did not envision. 
The § 363 sale of whole �irms is an essential aspect of a major change 
in bankruptcy practice. Insolvent �irms commonly renegotiate with the 
secured debt and other creditors. These deals have a common feature: In 
return for further credit, the �irm agrees on how the Chapter 11 process will 
be conducted and sometimes consents in advance to a sale if the �irm’s 
prospects do not improve. Despite the Q/M reorganization rules, 
bankruptcy courts enforce these contracts. As a consequence, the time a 
�irm spends in Chapter 11 has fallen from approximately 300 days in 2002 
to a little over 100 days today, all without any change in the putatively 
governing statute.111 Rather, courts and senior creditors are creating a 
private bankruptcy law that renders the reorganization rules obsolete. 
Because the Bankruptcy Code did not foresee a future where market 
                                                                                                                                                    
538 (providing empirical data showing that roughly two-thirds of all large bankruptcies in 
2009 resulted in the sale of an entire �irm rather than a traditional reorganization). 
 109. For a discussion of some of risks and considerations involved in § 363 sales, see 
Ashley Suarez, Comment, An Analysis of § 363(b) Sales: Justi�ied Deviations or Just Deviations?, 
22 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 988 (2020). 
 110. Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in 
the United States: Making Sense of the 19890s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121–22 (2001). 
[T]he 1980s ushered in a large wave of merger, takeover and 
restructuring activity. . . . The use of leverage was so great that from 1984 
to 1990, more than 500 billion dollars of equity was retired on net, as 
corporations repurchased their own shares, borrowed to �inance 
takeovers, and were taken private in leveraged buyouts . . . . The 1980s 
also saw the emergence of the hostile takeover and the corporate 
raider . . . . In the 1990s, the pattern of corporate governance activity 
changed again. After a steep but brief drop in merger activity around 
1990, takeovers rebounded to the levels of the 1980s. 
 111. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to 
the Critics, 107 MICH. L.REV. 603, 629 no.92–93 (2009) (noting that the medium and mean 
resolution times for Chapter 11 cases in 2002 were 274 and 327 days respectively). As 
insolvent �irms increasingly began to negotiate with creditors, the medium resolution time 
has decreased. In 2017, the medium duration for a sample of 30 cases was approximately four 
months (120 days). Norman N. Kinel, The Ever-Shrinking Chapter 11 Case, SQUIRE PATTON 
BOGGS (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.restructuring-globalview.com/2018/08/the-ever-
shrinking-chapter-11-case/#page=1. 
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conditions and new �inancing techniques would render the sale of whole 
�irms a desirable alternative to reorganization, it does not provide any 
guidance on a process that circumvents the reorganization rules. Whether 
this contemporary law adequately protects the public interest is thus an 
open question: Other parties are affected by the pre-Bankruptcy deals that 
are now being made and there is no reason to believe that the parties to 
§ 363 sales and the courts that permit them take the interests of nonparties 
into account. 
C. Obsolete Boilerplate in Private Contracts 
Continuing to use a contract with obsolete terms would be an 
inexplicable response when contracting parties are autarkic but, as we 
showed in Part II.C, it can be the best response when a party’s payoff under 
its contract partly depends on the contracts other market actors make. 
When contracts are standardized across a market, a party’s best response 
to its strategic situation may be to accept the terms of a bond contract even 
though its obsolete terms may generate costly judicial interpretations. In 
what follows, we offer examples of the persistence and signi�icant costs of 
obsolete terms in commercial boilerplate and of the inability of private 
markets to readily update these terms. 
 
1. The Obsolete Pari Passu Clause 
The fourteen-year battle over the meaning of the pari passu clause 
found in all sovereign debt contracts supports the prediction advanced in 
Part II.C that parties trading in large interdependent markets would fail to 
revise an obsolete term in a standardized contract. In 2000, a U.S. hedge 
fund, holding out from a restructuring proposal, won a judgment in which a 
Brussels courts interpreted the pari passu clause to provide that the debtor 
could not pay other creditors who had accepted a restructured offer without 
paying the hedge fund its full pro rata share.112 The clause had been a 
standard provision in sovereign debt contracts for 200 years, and it appears 
to have once �it the commercial pattern in the gunboat diplomacy era.113 But 
the term is inapplicable in the modern sovereign debt context in which a 
sovereign debtor’s assets are not seized and distributed to creditors under 
an insolvency process. Still, the clause persisted into the present, while few, 
if any, market participants seemed to understand either its historic or its 
contemporary meaning.114 
The international �inance community uniformly rejected the court’s 
interpretation, even though the �inancial markets could not agree on what 
                                                                                                                                                    
 112. Elliott Assocs., L.P., Cours d’Appel [CA] [Court of Appeal] Bruxelles, 8th Chamber 
Sept. 26, 2000, General Docket No. 2000/QR/92 (Belg.) 
 113. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 75, at ch. 8–9 (arguing that the clause made sense in the 
gunboat diplomacy era where, for example, creditors could seize a debtor’s port and recover 
by seizing and sharing the tax revenue). 
 114. Id. at 51–52, 109–118. 
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the obsolete term did mean.115 Standard theory predicts that if a court 
endorsed the market-disfavored option, parties would promptly revise the 
language to preclude that interpretation in the future.116 However, 
notwithstanding the litigation risk, the clause remained unrevised in all 
sovereign debt contracts for over a decade.117 Then, in 2011, following 
extensive litigation instigated by activist creditors holding out from 
Argentina’s restructuring offer, federal courts in New York adopted 
basically the same interpretation as the Brussel’s court.118 This more 
authoritative ruling was also uniformly condemned; market participants 
feared that the ruling would put the multitrillion dollar bond market at real 
risk. Nonetheless, even though the market continued to reject the court’s 
interpretation, revisions to the language of the pari passu term did not begin 
until late 2014, more than three years after the federal courts had ruled.119 
Meanwhile, the activist hedge funds recovered many times their initial 
investment by holding out from the restructuring agreement.120 
Obsolescence in these standard form commercial contracts thus creates the 
opportunity for contractual arbitrage: parties argue, ex post, that the 
obsolete term means something that the contracting parties, ex ante, didn’t 
contemplate. Contractual arbitrageurs have pro�ited by seeking out 
obsolete terms as litigation opportunities in other bond transactions as 
                                                                                                                                                    
 115. E.g., Charles G. Berry, Pari Passu Clause Means What Now? N.Y.L.J., Mar. 6, 2006, at 1, 
1; Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 
EMORY L. J. 871, 876 (2004); Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, To Rank Pari Passu or Not to Rank Pari 
Passu: That is the Question in Sovereign Bonds after the Latest Episode of the Argentine Saga, 
15 L. & BUS. REV. AMS., 745, 769 (2009). 
 116. See, e.g., MERTON H. MILLER, Debt and Taxes, in 1 SELECTED WORKS OF MERTON H. 
MILLER: A CELEBRATION OF MARKETS 103 (Bruce D. Grundy ed., 2002); Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & 
Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 123 (1979). 
 117. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 75, at 53–119. 
 118. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978, 2011 WL 9522565, at 
*2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011), aff’d 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
 119. Choi, Gulati & Scott, The Black Hole Problem, supra note 11, at 6. 
 120. See Matt Levine, Lucrative Bonds and Animated Toes, BLOOMBERG, (Mar. 2, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2016-03-02/lucrative-bonds-and-
animated-toes (describing the lucrative returns made by holdout investors). 
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well.121 In all these instances, the lack of accepted meaning makes it dif�icult 
to rebut the arbitrageur’s interpretation of the terms in question.122 
The preceding story vividly demonstrates two things: First, the costs 
are very high when private parties contracting in large, interdependent 
markets fail to revise obsolete terms. The pari passu clause was obsolete, 
but parties still needed to address the problem of how to pay creditors and 
retaining the clause rather than developing an apt alternative created an 
opportunity for strategic litigation.123 Second, despite the high costs, states 
can be trapped in inef�icient contracting equilibria for long periods of time. 
As Part II.C showed, doubts about the rationality and competence of other 
market actors could make retaining an obsolete term an individual state’s 
best response. In addition to these doubts, a possible innovator may be 
deterred by the legal uncertainty that can attend a differently written bond 
issue: Until the revised term is tested in litigation, there is uncertainty over 
how it will be interpreted. Individual parties also may be reluctant to draft 
new contractual language out of fear that the change to the contract 
language might put unrevised clauses in prior bonds of that sovereign at 
greater risk of enabling the arbitrageurs.124 Changing a term thus poses the 
further risk that the bond contract will be viewed as idiosyncratic, thereby 
increasing buyer learning costs.125 In sum, and as we predicted, even when 
faced with costly litigation, parties coordinated around the existing 
standard form instead of innovating to a solution that would better protect 
                                                                                                                                                    
 121. Contractual arbitrage has become a lucrative business in sovereign debt markets. 
When countries are near defaulting on their debts, �inancial �irms look for linguistic 
uncertainties that have not been fully priced and thus can be exploited when the sovereign 
seeks to restructure its debt. Greece faced these holdouts when restructuring in 2012. Ukraine 
faced a large group of sophisticated creditors in its restructuring in 2015. In 2016, the 
notorious Argentine settlement ended up paying the most aggressive of the holdout creditors 
between 300 and 800% of the principal amount of their claims. And Puerto Rico and 
Venezuela are currently dealing with a subset of these same creditors. For a further discussion 
of the rise of this form of arbitrage, see Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, 
Contractual Arbitrage, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 5 (Eric Brousseau et 
al. eds., 2020). 
 122. The problem is exacerbated when “encrustation” occurs as legal jargon and random 
variations are added to a term thereby further corrupting its linguistic meaning. See Goetz & 
Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice, supra note 9, at 289. 
 123. See Lucy McNulty, The Future for Pari Passu, 32 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 6, 19–20 (2013) 
(explaining that the market agreed on the need for change but could not overcome the 
challenges of moving to new standard). 
 124. Choi, Gulati & Scott, The Black Hole Problem, supra note 11, at 10. 
 125. Learning costs include the costs that parties must expend in learning the meaning of 
the clause. The prediction from the learning cost literature is that the older and more widely 
used a term becomes, the better is the common understanding of what it means. Marcel Kahan 
& Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The 
Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 719–25, 31–33 (1997); TINA L. STARK, 
NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING CONTRACT BOILERPLATE (2003) § 1.02 (observing that provisions 
that have been used repeatedly develop a “hallowed status”; they have now been “blessed”). 
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the buyers in the case of default.126 In the absence of any institutional 
mechanism, whether state or other entity, the sovereign debt industry lacks 
the capacity to solve its coordination problem readily. 
2. The Obsolete “No Recourse” Clause: Comparing Corporate Bonds and 
Private Equity Transactions 
In a recent study, Scott, Choi and Gulati analyzed the speed with which 
obsolete terms are revised in private equity driven M&A transactions and 
in large corporate bond issues.127 Both types of contracts contain a standard 
no recourse clause that had become obsolete with the introduction of 
limited liability under state corporate law.128 More recently, however, a 
series of prominent cases limited the protections of the standard no 
recourse provision to issues of contract liability.129 This left shareholders 
vulnerable to liability claims based on tort and other equitable theories.130 
The emerging case law and calls for revision from prominent practitioners 
should have motivated �irms in both markets to modify the obsolete clause 
to better protect against these non-contractual claims.131 
                                                                                                                                                    
 126. McNulty, supra note 120, at 44. The elite sovereign debt bar also had agency 
problems that contributed to the problem persisting. Id. at 51–52. 
 127. Robert E. Scott, Stephen J. Choi, & Mitu Gulati, Revising Boilerplate: A Comparison of 
Private and Public Company Transactions, 2020 WISC. L. REV. 629. 
 128. The no recourse clause was recognized as obsolete: The American Bar Association 
(ABA) project on model bond indentures considered it obsolete. But as with many obsolete 
clauses, drafters retained it in the standard contract and the ABA even provided a standard 
version of the clause it had labeled as useless. Glenn West & Natalie Smeltzer, Protecting the 
Integrity of the Entity-Speci�ic Contract: The ‘No Recourse Against Others’ Clause: Missing or 
Ineffective Boilerplate, 67 BUS. LAW. 39, 41–48 (2011). 
 129. E.g., Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988) (holding that the standard “no 
recourse provision only limits liability for breach of contract . . . .”); Mabon, Nugent & Co. v. 
Tex. Am. Energy Corp., 1988 WL 5492, at *3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 1988) (alter-ego claims not 
barred by standard no recourse provision in indenture); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns Co., 621 
A.2d 784, 793–94 (Del. Ch. 1992) (same); U.S. Bank N.A. v. U.S. Timberlands Klamath Falls, 
L.L.C., 864 A.2d 930, 950–51 (Del. Ch. 2004) (non-contractual claims not covered by “no 
recourse” provision); LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Perelman, 141 F. Supp. 2d 451, 463 (D. Del. 2001) 
(same). 
 130. See Peter B. Oh, Veil Piercing, 89 TEX. L. REV. 81, 107–10 (2010) (describing the rise 
in veil piercing cases); David H. Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 371, 
372–375 (1981) (reviewing the factors that courts consider in veil piercing cases). But see 
Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1048 
(1991) (failing to �ind a trend of courts �inding veil piercing). 
 131. Several exogenous shocks provided possible motivations for market participants to 
change the no recourse clause. First, as reported in supra note 126, a number of cases found 
that the clause only blocked contract law claims, and not equitable or tort claims. Then, in 
2011 Glenn West and Natalie Smeltzer published an article in a widely circulated business law 
publication on the need to revise the no recourse term and spoke about the term at meetings 
around the country. West & Smeltzer, supra note 125. 
 131. See Glenn D. West, Protecting the Private Equity Firm and its Deal Professionals, WEIL 
GOTSHAL GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY WATCH, May 23 (2016), 
https://privateequity.weil.com/features/protecting-private-equity-�irm-deal-professionals-
obligations-acquisition-vehicles-portfolio-companies. 
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The theory developed in Part II.C predicts that the obsolete version of 
the clause might be revised more rapidly in private equity deals than in 
corporate bond deals because of differences in the ability of parties in these 
two markets to coordinate on an apt solution to the contractual problem. 
Private equity �irms involved in M&A deals have concentrated and 
motivated principals with the expertise and �inancial incentives to optimize 
contract terms.132 Investors are also concentrated. Corporate bond 
transactions, on the other hand, are similar to sovereign bond deals with 
dispersed investors and dispersed shareholders, who also face high 
coordination and agency costs.133 In political science terms, private equity 
is a small numbers case, in which parties can explicitly cooperate rather 
than have to play the simultaneous move game that seems to best 
characterize the sovereign debt and public company debt markets. 
The data support the theory’s predictions.134 The vast majority of the 
corporate bond contracts continued to rely on the standard no recourse 
clause as it had emerged in the 1880s, con�irming the dif�iculty of 
coordinating on a revision of obsolete terms in large, interdependent 
markets.135 By contrast, over 50 percent of the private equity contracts 
were revised following a series of industry meetings in 2012 at which senior 
lawyers exhorted their colleagues to reform the clauses. Indeed, every 
contract created by the top �ive law �irms in the industry after 2012 has been 
revised.136 
                                                                                                                                                    
 132. John Coates’s work on M&A contracts also suggests different results in the two 
settings. See John Coates, Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence From Twenty Years of 
Deals, (Harv. L. Sch. John M. Olin Cntr., Discussion Paper No. 889, 2016), at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2862019. 
 133. Scott, Choi & Gulati, supra note 124, at 5. While the managers of corporate issuers 
may bene�it from no recourse clauses, and thus be more aligned than in the sovereign debt 
context, what is important is the greater dispersion of interests relative to a private equity 
setting. For a �inding, in a different setting, of superior drafting in private equity deals, see 
generally Elisabeth de Fontenay & Adam Badawi, Contractual Complexity in Debt Agreements: 
The Case of EBITDA (Duke L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Series, No. 2019–67, June 20, 2019 
draft), at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3455497. 
 134. Scott, Choi, and Gulati studied over six hundred transactions to see whether the term 
was changed in private equity or public debt deals after the shocks described in supra notes 
126 & 128. In public company deals, the “old” clause continued to dominate through 2019, 
although some used a modi�ied version of the clause. In contrast, private equity deals 
dramatically shifted towards new versions of the clause after 2012. This suggested that the 
term was stickier and harder to change where coordination costs were higher. Scott, Choi & 
Gulati, supra note 124, at 23. This is not to suggest that there is no evidence of innovation in 
corporate bond contracts. See, e.g., Kenneth Lehn & Annette B. Poulsen, Contractual Resolution 
of Bondholder-Stockholder Con�licts in Leveraged Buyouts, 34 J.L. & ECON. 645, 648 (1991) 
(describing evidence that, following 1988 RJR Nabisco LBO, 32.1% of 327 nonconvertible debt 
issued in 1989 had event risk provisions as compared to only 3 issues in 1986). Perhaps the 
distinction rests on the inertia that impedes revisions to obsolete boilerplate as compared to 
the greater incentive to introduce entirely new terms following an exogenous shock. 
 135. Scott, Choi & Gulati, supra note 124, at 21. 
 136. Id. at 25. 
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In the sovereign and corporate bond contexts, it is costly for parties to 
change standard clauses: They face a �irst-mover disadvantage if the market 
does not follow their lead, and any changes increase the risk of the old 
version of the clause being interpreted against their interests. Because 
parties cannot coordinate on an apt solution to their contracting problems, 
the equilibrium contract reproduces the status quo. And here the market 
contract continues to retain the obsolete no recourse term, though the term 
today carries a signi�icant litigation risk.137 
IV. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OBSOLESCENCE 
In this Part, we attempt to explain why the private lawmaking bodies— 
the ALI and ULC—and sometimes even legislative bodies like Congress, 
have been unable to produce a general and current commercial law. There 
are general reasons that explain this failure, but they apply in different 
degrees to different institutions. The common thread is the inability of the 
relevant actors to coordinate on necessary changes. In Part IV.A, we set out 
in broad terms the sources of the coordination problem. Part IV.B then 
focuses speci�ically on the inability of the ALI and ULC to revise sales law 
and general contract law. Part IV.C next studies Congress’s failure to revise 
the business sections of the Bankruptcy Code despite fundamental changes 
in bankruptcy practice. 
A. Political Economy Reasons that Explain Persistent Obsolescence 
Several political economy reasons explain why general contract law 
has been impossible to update. The �irst and most obvious impediment to 
updating obsolete terms in sales law or contract law generally is the 
institutional structure of the lawmaking bodies. The ALI and ULC are the 
prime exemplars of this problem. The ALI and ULC are constituted only by 
their members, a majority of whom are practicing lawyers and active 
judges. These members devote only a portion of their working time to the 
organizations because they are unpaid and have demanding jobs.138 The ALI 
also has a number of academic members, who also are unpaid unless they 
                                                                                                                                                    
 137. There is additional evidence that obsolete terms in corporate bond contracts are 
resistant to revision even after legal change creates signi�icant litigation risk. Choi, Gulati and 
Scott study whether and how lawyers across four different deal types—private equity M&A 
contracts, investment grade corporate bonds, sub-investment grade corporate bonds and 
sovereign bonds—revise their contracts’ governing law clauses in order to solve a problem 
that legal change had created. Their data show that lawyers who draft private equity M&A 
deals pay more attention to the deal terms than lawyers producing corporate and sovereign 
bond contracts. They observe signi�icantly more innovation in private equity deals as 
compared to sovereign and corporate bond transactions where the agency problems of 
drafting lawyers are greater and obsolete variations in the governing law clause persist 
without revision. Stephen F. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, Innovation and Encrustation: 
Agency Costs in Contract Reproduction (Duke L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Series, No. 2020–
57, Aug. 22, 2020), available on ssrn at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3653463. 
 138. Schwartz & Scott, The Political Economy, supra note 19, at 619, 630. 
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serve as reporters on study groups, for which they receive honoraria.139 
While the academic members are legal experts,  the ALI study groups lack 
the institutional capability to evaluate the likely welfare or other effects in 
the world of proposed reforms. Unlike a legislative committee or 
administrative agency, a study group cannot hold hearings in which 
witnesses from affected industries can be summoned (or would be 
permitted) to testify; nor can a study group fund research as to the possible 
effect of a proposed restatement section or uniform law. 140  Also, study 
groups dissolve after a restatement is adopted and so a particular group 
could not exercise oversight over a restatement’s performance and the 
continuing larger body is unable to make any investigations at all.  In sum, 
the ALI is ill equipped to evaluate the possible consequences of law reform 
proposals and not equipped at all to evaluate the actual consequences of 
those proposals once adopted. The ULC is similarly handicapped. 
. 
1. The Public Goods Problem of Revising a General Law 
The structural limitations that plague the ALI and the ULC help to 
explain why they proactively do not update our obsolete general contract 
law. There also is a public goods reason why outside interests fail to lobby 
these lawmaking bodies for change. Contract law affects many 
heterogenous parties. In contrast to a specialized �ield such as secured 
credit, the costs of an obsolete contract law thus fall on contracting parties 
generally, and the gains from updating contract law would accrue to 
contracting parties generally. Hence, an agent or even a cohesive interest 
group can be deterred from lobbying because they would bear large 
coordination and persuasion costs but realize only a fraction of the gains. 
The political economy reasons that explain why the lawmaking bodies do 
not initiate, and are infrequently forcefully asked to initiate, legal change are 
exacerbated by the selection process for ALI and ULC membership. The 
members are chosen by the organizations themselves in low visibility 
political environments. Therefore, an ALI member, say, does not have a 
public constituency to whom she owes favors or to whom she has to 
account. Rather, the ALI member, or a ULC commissioner, can serve for a 
long time without having to please anyone. The other side of this status is 
that the member does not gain much from pleasing anyone; that is, from 
initiating or supporting an ef�icient legal change. 
Time and space consistency problems also contribute to the failure to 
update the general law of contract. A contract law that applies broadly 
seldom becomes obsolete at once or everywhere. Consider, for example, an 
industry that the UCC Article 2 ef�iciently regulated in 1952. As the industry 
changed, various sales law rules could become obsolete. Parties’ 
obsolescence costs increase in the number of obsolete UCC sections. Hence, 
                                                                                                                                                    
      139 Study groups draft proposed Restatements, which they submit to the larger 
membership body. 
      140 Schwartz & Scott, The Political Economy, supra note 19 at 651. 
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if commercial change causes a large number of UCC terms to become 
obsolete at once, it could be cost justi�ied for the affected industry to lobby 
for a statutory change. But if changing commercial patterns only adversely 
effected a few sales law rules at one time or affected the rules for one 
industry at a time, there may never be a pro�itable moment for any single 
industry to lobby. To be sure, if multiple industries could coordinate their 
efforts, they might be an effective lobbying force. But there is no national 
institution that coordinates industry lobbying efforts for contract law 
change across commercial areas. Thus, while “the economy” may bene�it 
from lobbying for currently ef�icient contract law rules, there may be no 
group who could gain from doing so. 
2. The Role of Academic Reformers 
Proposals to revise contract and sales law rules thus largely come from 
academics who are members of groups that monitor law reform efforts. 
Academics often have strong policy preferences, and their policy-based 
desire to see a proposal adopted is reinforced by their desire for the prestige 
and possible consulting opportunities that come from being associated with 
an enacted reform. Academics, therefore, are motivated to advance 
proposals to update obsolete contract law rules. 
But the academics’ preference for change runs into another reason why 
private lawmaking groups like the ALI and ULC or the Bankruptcy 
Conference do not keep contract law current with changing commercial 
practice. The members of these bodies have a strong status quo bias. An 
implication of these groups’ inability to �ind facts is that the typical 
member—a busy lawyer or judge—cannot conveniently predict how a 
suggested reform will work out. The typical member also knows that his 
policy preferences usually are more conservative than those of the 
academic reformers.141 The member thus is less willing to believe an 
academic’s predictions than those of his more conservative business and 
lawyer friends.142 To be sure, a member wants to do, and be seen to do, 
                                                                                                                                                    
 141. For a summary of the evidence that academics tend to hold different preferences 
than the general public, see SEYMOUR M. LIPSET, THE SOURCES OF POLITICAL CORRECTNESS ON 
AMERICAN CAMPUSES 10–12 (Hoover Inst., Stanford Univ. Working Papers in Pol. Sci. P–92–1, 
1992). In the case of the ALI, the ALI Council, composed of academics, practicing lawyers and 
judges, re�lects a wider range of opinions on the merits of any proposal. And there is anecdotal 
evidence that the Council does exercise in�luence on the voting patterns of the membership, 
but there is no reason to believe that the Council is otherwise immune from the structural 
factors we identify. 
 142. The more closely that another person’s preferences resemble those held by a typical 
ALI or ULC member, the less incentive that person has to mislead the member. See Thomas W. 
Gilligan & Keith Krehbeil, Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature, 
34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 531, 548 (1990); see also Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Learning 
from Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed, 10 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 96, 106–09 
(1994) (discussing whom legislators are likely to believe); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 
Relying on the Information of Interested Parties, 17 RAND J. ECON. 18, 19 (1986) (“When 
information is not veri�iable, the reliability of any report depends in part on the degree of 
consonance between the objectives of the decisionmaker and those of the interested party or 
parties.”).. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3788595
50   
constructive law reform, which creates an impulse to implement projects. 
But the member also has a reputational stake in the products of any law 
reform effort. Because a member’s payoff is largely reputational, the 
impulse to pass something thus can be overcome by the fear that an 
academic-sponsored proposal will come back to bite.143 As a consequence, 
the academics’ reform efforts may be blocked or, if not, the enacted 
revisions will consist of highly abstract rules that delegate substantial 
discretion to courts.144 
3. The Effects of Interest Group Competition 
This fear of a reform that causes economic harm to an affected group 
or industry is the �inal factor explaining why lawmaking bodies like the ALI 
and ULC cannot produce current revisions to sales and contract law. Their 
fear is heightened when different interest groups somehow overcome the 
obstacles to lobbying for change. Indeed, interest group competition is the 
one explanation for persistent obsolescence that generalizes across our 
examples. If the gains from a proposed reform are suf�iciently concentrated 
to be worth seeking, the costs often are suf�iciently concentrated to make 
opposing the proposal worth doing as well. Suppose then that two opposing 
interest groups appear before the ALI seeking to change a contract law rule. 
Supporters of a reform will predict nirvana from its adoption and disaster 
from retaining the status quo. The other group will defend the status quo 
and predict disaster from the new reform. The result typically is 
stalemate.145 Private lawmaking groups are institutionally incapable of 
evaluating the status quo or �inding out which group has the better-
grounded case. Thus, individual members are left at sea and their best 
response often is to pass nothing. And as we show in the following sections, 
often nothing passes.146 
                                                                                                                                                    
 143. For a formal statement of this argument, see Schwartz & Scott, The Political Economy, 
supra note 19, at 611–15. 
 144. Id. at 645–47. See also Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of 
International Sales Law, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 446, 461–62 (2005). 
 145. Schwartz & Scott, The Political Economy, supra note 19, at 648–51. 
 146. The political economy barriers to the production of currently ef�icient contract 
terms by private lawmakers raise the question of how to explain the initial success of the UCC 
and the Second Restatement in overcoming these constraints. The short answer is that the 
political economy of today is quite different than that of the mid-century when the UCC and 
Restatement were adopted. The UCC project languished throughout the 1950s and early 60s 
until the banking interests became committed to the adoption of Articles 3,4, and 9 and 
lobbied strenuously in state legislatures for passage of the Code. Article 2, on this account, 
was simply carried along by the special interests who succeeded in passing legislation that 
they favored. Scott, supra note 6, at 1030–32. By 1967, all the states had adopted the UCC and 
the impetus grew to develop a new Restatement to harmonize general contract law with the 
new sales law. This led to the adoption of the Second Restatement that, in addition to adopting 
basic common law doctrines from the �irst Restatement, also proposed new default rules 
borrowed directly from Article 2. Id. These included new rules on interpretation, commercial 
impracticability, modi�ication, inde�initeness and open terms. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
CONTRACTS §§ 213–23, 261, 89, 30, 33. In the intervening years, the rise of globalization and 
new technology has not only changed contracting practices but it has changed the political 
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B. Evidence from UCC Sales Law and the Restatement of Contracts 
1 The Twenty-Four-Year Saga of Attempts to Reform Sales Law 
 Article 2 sales law is obsolete and needs revision. This uncontested fact 
has been self-evident for many decades. The information revolution and 
other market developments threaten to leave Article 2 in an increasingly 
small backwater of commercial transactions. If the statute is to retain its 
primacy as a source of legal defaults that both facilitate and regulate 
commercial sales transactions, it must be adapted to technological and 
economic developments that have created entirely new markets in 
information technology. 
In 1987, the Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC set out, under the 
auspices of a study committee, to consider modernizing the statute. Four 
years later, acting upon the report and recommendation of the study 
committee, the ALI and ULC appointed a drafting committee to begin work 
on a comprehensive revision of Article 2, which, among other things, would 
bring within the scope of Article 2 provisions to address the unique 
characteristics of software licensing transactions. The �irst public indication 
that the project was beginning to unravel surfaced when the ALI declined to 
approve proposed Article 2B for computer information contracts on the 
ground that the drafting process, dominated by the software and 
information industry, had produced a “seller-friendly” statute.147 The ULC 
decided, however, to go forward with the project on its own, reissuing the 
statute as the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA).148 
The split between the ALI and ULC broke into the open in 1999, when 
Revised Article 2 was brought forward for �inal approval. The revised 
Article was approved by the ALI, but after encountering severe opposition 
from industry interests the leadership of the ULC withdrew the draft from 
consideration two months later. In an attempt to patch the tattered alliance 
together, ALI and ULC agreed on a newly reconstituted drafting committee 
which was directed to focus only on “non-controversial,” technical 
amendments to the existing statute.149 Two years later, the new committee 
brought forward proposed Amendments to Article 2, which were approved 
by the ALI only to be defeated on the �loor of the ULC. That deadlock was 
�inally broken, and the Amendments were approved by ULC in August 2002 
but only by virtue of a strategy that carefully preserved the status quo in the 
                                                                                                                                                    
economy of private legislatures as well. Revisions to the UCC and the Restatement sometimes 
face intense interest group competition. See infra text accompanying notes 141–53. For 
discussion of the competing forces, see Clayton P. Gillette, Politics and Revision: A Comment on 
Scott, 80 VA. L. REV. 1853 (1994). 
 147. Scott, supra note 6, at 1049. 
 148. Subsequently, UCITA was adopted in Virginia and Maryland, but has encountered 
stiff opposition from consumer interests in other jurisdictions. Id. at 1049–50. 
 149. See Richard E. Speidel, Revising UCC Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52 HASTINGS 
L. REV. 607, 615–17 (2001). 
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ongoing competition over the regulation of computer information 
transactions.150 
In the end, the story ended not with a bang but with a whimper. The 
2003 Amendments immediately generated considerable controversy and 
faced interest group opposition in the various state legislatures. Over the 
next eight years, not a single state adopted the Amendments to Article 2. 
Recognizing the inevitable, the ALI withdrew the proposed Amendments in 
May 2011. 
 The open split between the ALI and ULC is merely a symptom of the 
intense interest group competition that emerged during the Article 2 
revision process. Retail manufacturing interests, opposed to provisions that 
extended warranty liability for economic loss to remote sellers, were able 
successfully to block the adoption of the initial revisions to Article 2. In turn, 
consumer interests (including large �irm licensees), opposed to the “seller-
friendly” provisions in the proposed Article 2B, were able to separate the 
computer information article from the rest of the UCC project. From there 
the battleground moved to rival efforts to either secure or block the further 
enactment of UCITA.151 Thus, even in the effort to bring forward the 
seemingly uncontroversial Amendments to Article 2, each side was able to 
block approval of the other’s proposals but was unable to secure approval 
of its own. 
It is unlikely that Article 2 will ever be revised to deal directly with any 
of the unique contracting problems presented by new contracting practices. 
Whatever happens in the future, therefore, common law courts will be 
called upon to resolve the increasingly intense normative debate over the 
domain of free contract in computer information transactions, as well as to 
�ill gaps in commercial disputes arising from the new technology. The law 
will be updated by the common law mechanism that creates contract law 
rules, but there will be few rules and they will develop slowly. 
2. Stalled Efforts to Promulgate the Restatement of Consumer Contracts 
                                                                                                                                                    
 150. The issue that led to the defeat of the Amendments by the ULC in August 2002 and 
the subsequent compromise was the de�ined scope of Article 2: Did it apply to information 
technology? All attempts to draft a clearer and more de�initive scope provision that drew lines 
between the coverage of Article 2 and the coverage of other laws dealing with information 
and software transactions fell victim to interest group competition. The drafting committee 
forged a new compromise, one that left the original scope provision unchanged, but amended 
the de�inition of goods in U.C.C. § 2–103 to exclude information. This version was approved 
by the ULC. By leaving “information” unde�ined, the compromise purported to leave to the 
courts the task of de�ining the line of demarcation between goods and computer information 
transactions. Scott, supra note 6, at 1051–52. 
 151. In the meantime, the ALI began a project to draft Principles for the Law of Software 
Contracts. The Principles were published by the ALI in 2010 and are now offered to courts to 
aid them in resolving disputes over computer information transactions. For more discussion 
on the Principles, see generally Robert A. Hillman & Maureen A. O’ Rouke, Principles of the Law 
of Software Contract: Some Highlights, 84 TU. L. REV 1519 (2010); Juliet M. Moringiello & 
William L. Reynolds, What’s Software Got to Do With It? The ALI Principles of the Law of 
Software Contracts, 84 TU. L. REV 1541 (2010). 
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 No comprehensive revision to the Second Restatement of Contracts 
has been attempted since 1978 and none appears imminent.152 But the ALI 
has appointed reporters and an advisory committee to propose a 
restatement for consumer contracts. The academic reporters for the project 
conducted a careful empirical study of contemporary consumer 
transactions and, following the learning from that data, they attempted to 
shift the consumer paradigm away from the classic bilateral contract in 
which each party assents to terms presented by the other. The proposed 
Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts thus abandons what the 
drafters believe is the �iction of mutual assent in consumer contracting.153 
The drafters proposed instead to substitute the ex post regulation of 
abusive terms under the unconscionability doctrine. 154 While the merits of 
the proposed reform are open to debate, earlier failures of such case by case 
adjudication to eliminate imperfections in consumer markets raised 
concerns that the proposed Restatement similarly may fail to provide 
adequate consumer protection.155 
The recommendation to change the common law concept of assent as 
applied to consumer transactions thus provoked a sharp negative response: 
There has been a widespread adverse reaction to the proposed Restatement 
by consumer advocates, regulators, and some academics.156 Prior to the 
                                                                                                                                                    
 152. E-mail from Richard L. Revesz, Exec. Dir., ALI, to Robert E. Scott, Alfred McCormack 
Professor of L., Colum. L. Sch. (Feb. 16, 2016, 11:25 PM) (on �ile with the authors). 
 153. See RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 2, cmt. 13 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft, 
2019) (arguing that while the mutual assent doctrine was once “a meaningful mechanism” to 
protect consumers, the ubiquity of standard-form contracts has “diluted the effectiveness and 
plausibility of such front end self-protection”). A different view of consent holds that consent 
does not require an individual person to have the ability to affect particular terms. Rather, a 
consumer consents to a contract if she knows what the contract does, in the same sense that 
a person consents to the purchase of a toaster if she knows how the commands work. See Ian 
Ayres and Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
545, 552, 606 (2014). 
 154. RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 5, cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft, 
2019) (“Because consumers rarely read or review the non-core, standard contract terms . . . 
the doctrine of unconscionability is a primary tool against the inclusion of intolerable terms 
in the consumer contract . . . .”). 
 155. A plaintiff faces a high burden of proof to recover on an unconscionability claim. 
Susan Landrum, Much Ado About Nothing?: What the Numbers Tell Us About How State Courts 
Apply the Unconscionability Doctrine to Arbitration Agreements, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 767 
(2014). A further problem is that consumers must recognize that they have the legal right to 
seek redress for an unconscionable contract. Recent experimental evidence suggests that 
consumers may fail to pursue legitimate claims owing to a misplaced belief that unfair terms 
are legally permissible. Meirav Furth-Matzkin & Roseanna Sommers, Consumer Psychology 
and the Problem of Fine Print Fraud, 72 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 20), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3378353. 
 156. See, e.g., Adam Levitin et al, The Faulty Foundation of the Draft Restatement of 
Consumer Contracts, 36 YALE J. REG. 447, 448 (2019) (challenging the proposed Restatement 
and the cases on which it relies for its privacy policy); Gregory Klass, Empiricism and Privacy 
Policies in the Restatement of Consumer Contract Law, 36 YALE J. REG. 45, 45 (2019) (same). See 
also, Dee Pridgen, ALI's Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts: Perpetuating a Legal 
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May 2019 meeting of the ALI to vote on approving the Draft Restatement, 
twenty-three Attorneys General sent a letter to the membership of the ALI 
urging the members to reject the proposed Restatement owing to its 
abandonment of the concept of assent.157 Following the widespread 
distribution of this letter, little action was taken in the May 2019 meeting 
on the proposed �inal draft of the Restatement. In sum, a focused effort to 
revise the Restatement of Contracts as it applies to consumer transactions 
has foundered over ongoing disputes between consumer protection 
advocates and commercial parties.158 
C. Evidence from Bankruptcy Law 
The political economy of bankruptcy obsolescence is different from the 
political economy of the ALI and ULC in important respects, but similar in 
others. The principal difference is that members of Congress have 
constituencies and Congress has committees that can exercise ongoing 
supervision of a commercial statute’s performance. What is to be explained, 
then, is why a congress that can update a statute doesn’t. 
 We begin with an origin story. The 1978 Code was the product of a 
commission that Congress established to amend the Bankruptcy Act of 
1938. The commission was composed of bankruptcy lawyers, legislators, 
federal judges, and bankruptcy professors.159 The bankruptcy community 
then believed that four defects attended the conduct of business 
bankruptcies under Chapter 10, the chapter of the 1938 bankruptcy law 
that regulated large �irm reorganizations. The Chapter had several costly 
formal requirements. Importantly, the SEC was a necessary participant in 
the proceedings for public companies.160 Its participation was intended to 
ensure that bankruptcies were fair to all and maximized the insolvent �irm’s 
value. The bankruptcy professionals believed, however, that any gains in 
fairness and value were outweighed by the consequent length and 
additional other costs that the SEC’s participation added to 
                                                                                                                                                    
Fiction?, 32 Loyola Consumer L. Rev. (2020), available at ssrn: https://ssrn.com/abstract = 
3734525. 
 157. See Letter from Letitia James, Attorney Gen. of N.Y., to the Membership of the Am. 
Law Inst., (May 14, 2019) (on �ile with the authors). 
 158. The commercial parties have had an advantage in this long-lived dispute. In the 
absence of ought else, ALI members are likely to believe their colleagues and associates, and 
the members have more colleagues in the business community than in the consumer 
protection community. The business parties could not cash out this advantage in getting the 
consumer law they preferred, however. The ALI then attempted to elide the entire dispute by 
creating the new study group to produce the restatement of consumer contract law. As noted 
in the text, the study group attempted to actually restate the law, but their drafts were 
controversial nevertheless, and thus nothing has passed so far. 
 159. Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, 29 BUS. LAW. 
75–76 (1973). 
 160. DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 162 
(2014) [hereinafter Skeel, Debt’s Dominion]. 
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reorganizations.161 In addition, under Chapter 10 a trustee managed the 
�irm during reorganization proceedings.162 Creditors elected the trustee 
from a set of bankruptcy lawyers, who would then, with the approval of the 
bankruptcy referee, retain another lawyer from the set as its counsel.163 The 
lawyer/trustees had little business expertise and no prior acquaintance 
with the insolvent �irm. Debtors managed by trustees thus had dif�iculty 
raising capital in the credit market.164 Finally, creditor consent to a plan had 
to be unanimous. 165 This rule gave small creditors hold up power, which 
increased cost and delay. 
The 1978 Code attempted to respond to these concerns in four major 
ways. The Code created the “debtor in possession:” The insolvent �irm’s 
managers would continue to operate the �irm during a reorganization under 
the new Chapter 11.166 Management continuity was accurately expected to 
increase the insolvent �irm’s access to credit.167 Second, the SEC’s required 
attendance was eliminated.168 Third, a majority of creditors in a class—e.g., 
bondholders—could consent to a reorganization.169 Fourth, the role of the 
bankruptcy referee was upgraded to that of a (non-Article III) court. But 
without a trustee or SEC participation, and with the insolvent �irm itself in 
charge, there was a question of whether a reorganization would be run in 
the interest of all creditors. The Code attempted to protect the public 
interest by giving creditors and the debtor in possession the right to have 
every major (and some minor) bankruptcy decisions—e.g., whether the 
debtor could sell assets under § 363 or whether the debtor could assume a 
long-term contract—be made by the bankruptcy court after a hearing in 
which affected parties could participate.170 The statute, however, seldom 
                                                                                                                                                    
 161. Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. 
L. REV. 47, 109 (1997) (noting that Chapter 10 proceedings took a long time and entailed 
numerous formal hearings and reports). 
 162. See SKEEL, Debt’s Dominion, supra note 155, at 161–62 (2014). 
 163. A referee was the of�icial who oversaw the bankruptcy case. Referees had more 
limited powers than today’s bankruptcy judges and were not executive appointments. Id. at 
41. 
 164. Cf. David C. Smith, An Unnecessary Chapter 11 Overhaul, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2015), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/david-c-smith-an-unnecessary-chapter-11-overhaul-
1420762078 (“The 1978 law was adapted to allow for more innovative restructurings, 
including capital-raising during bankruptcy to fund operations (through so-called debtor-in-
possession, or DIP, �inancing).”). 
 165. See Posner, supra note 156, at 64–5. 
 166. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 1107, 92 Stat. 2549, 2628–29 
(1978). 
 167. See supra discussion of absolute priority, in Section III.C.2. 
 168. See Pub. L. No. 95–598, § 1109, 92 Stat. 2629 (allowing the SEC only the right to raise 
and appear in cases but forbidding it from appealing any judgment, order, or decree in the 
case). 
 169. Id.§ 1129, 92 Stat. 2636. 
 170. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–598, § 363(c)(2)(B), 92 Stat. 2572 
(1978). 
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identi�ies the �indings a court must make after these hearings, so whether 
any hearing result is in the public interest is up to the courts, not the statute. 
Turning to political economy, the 1978 Code created large bene�its for 
a sophisticated and cohesive group—the bankruptcy lawyers and referees, 
many of whom expected to become actual judges—and for supportive 
academics. This group sought the new law because it would make 
bankruptcy a litigation-centered procedure under a statute whose 
vagueness would make litigation common.171 Another cohesive group, 
secured creditors—the “asset-backed lenders”—supported the new Code 
because it protected security interests and so preserved the creditors’ 
business model.172 The gains to the lawyer group in the form of increased 
fees for participating in increased procedures were costs to borrowers and 
small lenders, neither of whom appeared in the Congressional hearings.173 
Finally, Congress itself supported the new law because the creation of a new 
class of judges increased Congress’s opportunities for patronage, and 
because the Code pleased groups who had the power and resources to 
please congresspersons.174 
We tell this origin story for two reasons. First, the bankruptcy bar 
remains cohesive and has new friends—the M&A lawyers who help conduct 
§ 363 sales of entire �irms. The Congress also continues to enjoy making 
judicial appointments. Second, changing patterns of �inance have actually 
increased bene�its for the coalition that helped to pass the Code. As the 
statute’s relation to commercial behavior becomes more attenuated, it 
becomes the lawyers and courts’ task to create a new common law of 
bankruptcy.175 The combination of a current, very large �inancial sector and 
judge-made law thus have combined to convert bankruptcy practice from a 
small law �irm specialty to a large law �irm lucrative practice.176 
This story illustrates the continuing power of a group that can get a 
statute passed because it creates gains for them. The group also has an 
incentive, and sometimes the ability, to block change when the gains persist 
                                                                                                                                                    
 171. David A. Skeel Jr., Bankruptcy Lawyers and the Shape of American Bankruptcy Law, 
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 511–12 (1998) [hereinafter Skeel, Bankruptcy Lawyers] 
(“[B]ankruptcy lawyers have an obvious incentive to lobby for rules that encourage the use of 
bankruptcy, because more bankruptcy means more work.”). 
 172. See Posner, supra note 156, at 111 (describing how secured creditors can extract 
value from small creditors and nonmanagement shareholders); Skeel, Bankruptcy Lawyers, 
supra note 166, at 498 (noting that secured creditors enjoy “priority status and [the] ability 
to adjust their interest rates in response to debtor-friendly bankruptcy laws”). 
 173. See Posner, supra note 156, at 111, 113 (noting that small creditors “were not 
organized [and] did not testify,” while commercial bankruptcy lawyers “wanted their clients 
- the managers [and large creditors] – to �ind reorganization attractive so that they would 
enter reorganization as much as possible” and thereby command more fees). 
 174. Id. at 77. 
 175. See supra text accompanying notes 106–108. 
 176. See Skeel, Debt’s Dominion, supra note 155, at 221–23 (describing the rise of large 
bankruptcy practices and noting that “forty-nine of the �ifty largest New York law �irms now 
claim to have a bankruptcy practice”). 
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or increase. The 1978 law stands because the law has done for decades what 
the coalition that passed it intended the law to do: to create rents for the 
coalition. And the coalition has had the power to prevent statutory change. 
In addition, bankruptcy resembles the UCC and ULC in an important respect: 
The presence of competing interest groups can induce legislative stasis. 
Efforts to amend the Code in 2000-2001 thus foundered over competition 
between industry groups—auto companies versus credit card companies; 
the Delaware Bar versus lawyers from elsewhere—for special privileges.177 
The reasons for the failure to revise an obsolete law are similar to those for 
commercial law generally: Business bankruptcy is a technical �ield where 
legislators have dif�iculty evaluating the consequences of statutory change. 
Controversy thus can induce legislative paralysis. 
Ongoing attempts to change bankruptcy law continue to �lounder. 
Beginning in the early 1930s, and continuing in the 1973 Commission 
Report, interested parties have suggested that Congress create a 
bankruptcy agency.178 In the most recent incarnation of this proposal, the 
agency’s jurisdiction would mainly be consumer insolvencies, but the 
agency would consider business issues as well.179 The justi�ications were 
standard: an agency would have expertise, its procedures would be cheap 
to access relative to adjudication, and it would exercise continuing oversight 
over the �ield.180 The lawyer and judge coalition defeated the proposal. The 
judges objected because the agency’s judicial role would reduce the judges’ 
importance,181 and the lawyers objected because the agency’s counseling 
                                                                                                                                                    
 177. See, e.g., Associated Press, Legislation to Overhaul Laws on Bankruptcy Dies as 
President Fails to Sign It, N.Y. Times (Dec. 20, 2000), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/20/us/legislation-to-overhaul-laws-on-bankruptcy-
dies-as-president-fails-to-sign-it.html (describing the failure to pass the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 2000 and some of the interest group con�licts that were implicated). For a discussion of 
how interest groups in�luence bankruptcy law, see Skeel, Debt’s Dominion, supra note 155, at 
80–86. 
 178. E.g., H.R. DOC. NO. 93–137, at 117–53 (1973) (proposing a bankruptcy agency that 
would regulate consumer insolvencies); STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM: 
THE REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE, S. DOC. NO. 72–65 
(1932); Skeel, Debt’s Dominion, supra note 155, at 78–9 (describing the Thacher Report’s 
proposals to shift bankruptcy’s administrative structure to a model more in line with the 
English approach); Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of 
Bankruptcy Administration, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384, 447 (2012) (describing William J. Donovan’s 
proposal to create “a federal bankruptcy commissioner’s of�ice to help separate the judicial 
functions from the administrative functions in bankruptcy proceedings”); William J. Donovan, 
The Proposed Revision of the National Bankruptcy Act, Credit Monthly (1930). 
 179. H.R. DOC. NO. 93–137, at 117–53 (1973). 
 180. Cf. DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 
(Wash., D.C.: Brookings Inst., 1971) (advocating for similar proposals for a bankruptcy 
agency); see also SKEEL, Debt’s Dominion, supra note 155, at 246 n.1 (“The Brookings study had 
an enormous in�luence on the debates that led to the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.”). 
 181. Posner, supra note 156, at 77 (“The federal judges opposed the creation of more 
independent bankruptcy courts, because (1) they would lose their appointment power over 
bankruptcy judges . . . , and (2) their status would be diluted through the vast increase in the 
number of federal judicial positions.”). 
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function would reduce the revenue of the consumer bankruptcy bar.182 
There were claims—not necessarily consistent—that the agency would 
produce more bankruptcies because it was cheap to access, but the agency 
also would be costly and bureaucratic.183 Oversight also can be dif�icult to 
implement. 
V. THE PRODUCTION PROBLEM REDUX: INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO 
OBSOLESCENCE 
We turn now in Part V to confront directly the comparative 
institutional question: Which institutions respond to the commercial law 
production problem and how well do they do it? 
A. Default Rules Created by Common Law Courts 
Let’s begin by returning to the conditions for an ef�icient default rule 
that we set out in the Introduction. A default rule is needed when many 
parties face a similar contracting problem that they cannot economically 
solve. This condition is satis�ied when a typical contracting dyad could not 
internalize enough of the gain from an ef�icient solution to justify the costs 
of creating it. A state-supplied default would then be ef�icient if the solution 
would yield bene�its to private parties that exceeded the sum of the state’s 
creation costs and the possible externality costs that the use of the term 
creates. To be sure, the typical contract does not create large costs for third 
parties, but a successful default would be widely used, and so it could have 
substantial third-party effects. Thus, an ef�icient default would take both the 
private and the public interest into account. There is then a production 
problem when the private sector undersupplies ef�icient defaults but the 
state fails to �ill the gap. 
In the Introduction we argued that common law courts partially �ill the 
production gap by supplying ef�icient default rules. But precisely how does 
the common law mechanism achieve this result? Four factors explain how 
                                                                                                                                                    
 182. Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil 
and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. app. 1269–70 (1975–
1976) (testimony of George Ritner, California attorney); Skeel, Debt’s Dominion, supra note 
155, at 143 (describing how bankruptcy lawyers would be one of the biggest losers from a 
potential bankruptcy agency); Posner, supra note 156, at 83 (“[Bankruptcy] lawyers argue 
that the agency would ‘destroy the private consumer bankruptcy bar’ and create a ‘monopoly 
of law counselors.’”). 
 183. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the 
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 
app. 1028–29 (1975–1976) (testimony of Walter W. Vaughan, Vice President, American 
Security Bank, and Chairman, American Bankers Association and Consumer Bankers 
Association Task Force on Bankruptcy); id. at 1044–45 (statement of Walter Ray Phillips, 
Household Finance Corporation); id. at 1361 (statement of Alvin O. Wiese, Jr., Chairman, 
Subcommittee on Bankruptcy, National Consumer Finance Association); Jeb Barnes, Bankrupt 
Bargain—Bankruptcy Reform and the Politics of Adversarial Legalism, 13 J.L. & POL. 893, 916 
(1997). 
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common law adjudication works both to create and update contract law 
rules. First, litigation is costly, so parties choose to go to court only after they 
have been unable to resolve their problem through negotiation, mutual 
adjustment, or settlement. Consequently, contract disputes typically reach 
a court only when the relevant contract lacks a clear solution to the problem 
at issue. Second, courts create rules—solutions to problems—in the course 
of interpreting a contract or �illing in a contract gap. If subsequent parties 
accept the rule by not contracting away from it, the rule becomes a default. 
But a court-created rule will not be accepted by very many parties unless it 
is transcontextual: The rule must solve a problem that parties face in highly 
disparate contexts and condition on public information. Third, while courts 
cannot calculate the magnitude of any third-party effects from a proposed 
rule, courts do commonly consider both fairness and public policy concerns 
when creating rules. Fourth, changing commercial patterns create new 
cases and so permit courts to revisit existing rules or create new ones. In 
this way, the common law updates.184 
In sum, common law adjudication responds well to the production 
problem. But, as we have also noted, the common law response to the 
production problem is limited: Common law courts can only produce 
transcontextual rules, and cases arising from new commercial patterns 
come to appellate courts slowly, and so the common law updates slowly. 
B. Private Alternatives to Publicly Supplied Rules 
The limitations of common law courts raise the question whether other 
private institutions respond to the production problem. A few private 
institutions do supply parties with contract terms. The International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association (ISDA) updates derivative contract terms in 
light of changed conditions. The terms are voluntary, but the ISDA also 
makes binding determinations regarding what constitutes a credit or 
succession “event” (such as a merger), either of which may trigger 
obligations under a credit default swap contract.185 Parties can change their 
contracts in light of these de�initions. The International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) has created a set of rules—The Uniform Customs & 
Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP 600) —that regulate most letters of 
credit.186 Parties must choose speci�ically to incorporate the UCP 600 rules 
                                                                                                                                                    
 184. See discussion in supra Part I. 
 185. For discussion of the history of the formation of the derivatives association and the 
creation of its standard-setting structure, see Jeffery B. Golden, Setting Standards in the 
Evolution of Swap Documentation, 13 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 18, 18–19 (1994); Sean M. Flanagan, The 
Rise of a Trade Association: Group Interactions within the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 211, 227–53 (2001). 
 186. Commercial letters of credit are a typical form of payment in sales across long 
distances. A letter of credit requires that the bene�iciary, usually the seller, present certain 
documents to the issuer of the letter, usually a bank, in order for the bank to honor the letter. 
Letters are valuable for sellers because the bank must honor a letter even if the buyer has a 
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into their contracts. Industry experts created the UCP 600 and regularly 
update its rules.187 The ICC also created “Incoterms,” a set of eleven 
internationally recognized rules that regulate the conduct of international 
sales, such as shipment terms, insurance requirements, documentation, and 
other activities. Parties may elect to use the regularly updated Incoterms 
rather than the UCC sections that regulate similar transactions.188 
The defaults that these institutions supply are privately ef�icient for 
much the same reasons that common law defaults are ef�icient. Parties 
would not use the terms unless they solved contracting problems. There 
also is a feedback mechanism that the common law lacks: If parties, say, 
decline to use a UCP 600 rule because the rule does not solve the contracting 
problem that they face, the ICC will change the rule. Hence, UCP 600 rules 
are privately ef�icient and current. The rules may not be ef�icient for society 
as a whole, however, because the ICC does not have an incentive to consider 
the public interest. Nevertheless, the success of such rules raises the 
question why more such groups have not formed.189 
There is little question that more private updating institutions are 
needed. As the evidence we reviewed above shows, while updating through 
private action does occur in some instances, such efforts are episodic and 
slow to take effect. This is clearly illustrated by the stasis that gripped the 
sovereign debt market even in the face of multi-billion-dollar payouts to 
activist hedge funds. To be sure, a group of state and quasi-state of�icials led 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) �inally effected a widely used 
change to the pari passu term in sovereign debt contracts after more than 
three years of trying. But the IMF did not (and does not) regard such 
coordination as a part of its mission.190 Moreover, as we saw, parties to 
corporate debt contracts continue to use obsolete clauses even in the face 
                                                                                                                                                    
colorable claim that the seller breached the contract between them. See generally Christopher 
Leon, Letters of Credit: A Primer, 45 MD. L. REV. 432 (1986). 
 187. Article 5 of the UCC governs letters of credit, but the UCP is the most important 
source of letter of credit law on an international level. UCC Article 5 allows parties to opt for 
the rules of the UCP 600, with a few exceptions for terms that cannot be changed. See U.C.C. 
§ 5–116 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1995). UCP 600 was last updated in 2007. 
 188. All contracts using Incoterms are valid if they are agreed upon by all parties to the 
transaction and the relevant Incoterms are correctly identi�ied on the export-related 
documents. Although the ICC recommends using the latest version—Incoterms 2020—
parties to a sales contract can agree to use any version of Incoterms. Incoterms supplant UCC 
§§ 2–319 to 2–325. 
 189. Some industries, usually involving commodities such as cotton or grain, create trade 
associations that produce rules that govern contracting among the members, but disputes 
under the rules are resolved in arbitrations. As a consequence, the industries do not create 
contract law for society. For discussion, see Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the 
Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
1724 (2001); see also Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s 
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1771–77 (1996) (discussing 
rules of the National Grain and Feed Association, which require that all disputes among 
members must be submitted to the Association’s arbitration system). 
 190. See supra notes 109–123 and accompanying text. 
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of litigation risks. Again, there is no institution that monitors the corporate 
debt market to address these obsolescence concerns. 
We have seen that private lawyers in discrete areas can sometimes 
effect change. For example, the top �ive private equity law �irms recently 
revised the ubiquitous “no recourse” clause in every major deal contract 
even while the corporate bond market retained the same obsolete clause.191 
Thus, circumstances exist in which lawyers and other insiders can function 
as a “spider in the web” to produce a coordinating equilibrium.192 In the case 
of the M&A example, the specialized bar was able to keep the law current. 
But the question remains whether the resulting contractual revisions re�lect 
only lawyer and client interests. 
C. Public Interventions: The Problem with Specialized Commercial Statutes 
The lesson of these private efforts to keep contract rules current in 
particular �ields suggests that state-supplied defaults remain an important 
element in maintaining an ef�icient contract law. But turning to public 
mechanisms and specialized commercial statutes, we �ind the same story 
repeating. The UCC ushered in a new moment for uniform specialized 
statutory rules, ranging from commercial paper and bank deposits, to 
letters of credit, to documents of title, and to secured credit.193 Unlike the 
failure to revise sales law, every one of these specialized commercial statues 
has been revised, some more than once. But just as the private institutions 
that update specialized �ields are subject to the concern about private 
interest supplanting the public interest, the history of the revisions to the 
UCC’s specialized commercial statutes reveal a similar pattern. We take up 
Article 9 and Articles 3 & 4 of the UCC as the two exemplars of this problem. 
1. Revising Article 9: Protecting the Interests of Secured Creditors 
There was extensive interest group participation, largely by asset-
based �inancers and banks, in the original drafting of Article 9. The principal 
reporter of the Article 9 project, Grant Gilmore, documented the events that 
led banks and �inance companies to support the UCC project that they had 
earlier rejected as a radical reform.194 This support developed after Homer 
Kripke, then a legal counsel to CIT Financial Corp., became one of the key 
advisors to Gilmore and the other drafters.195 Kripke subsequently 
described how, during their drafting deliberations, banking interests 
                                                                                                                                                    
 191. See supra notes 124–134 and accompanying text. 
 192. The “spider in the web” metaphor captures the observation that a controlling entity 
or hierarchy at the center of a network can function to facilitate coordination among network 
members. See Ariel Porat & Robert E. Scott, Can Restitution Save Spiderless Networks?, 8 HARV. 
BUS. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2018). 
 193. These specialized statutes, each of which has been recently revised, are found in UCC 
Articles 3 and 4, 5,7, and 9 respectively. Article 6 covering Bulk Sales proved to an impediment 
to current commerce and the 1989 revision recommended repeal. See Article 6 prefatory note. 
 194. See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 86 (1967). 
 195. See Grant Gilmore, Dedication to Professor Homer Kripke, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9, 11 
(1981). 
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blocked proposed clauses that would have imposed on them the costs of 
various consumer-protection provisions.196 He reported that avoiding 
arousing the opposition of banks and �inance companies was necessary in 
order to ensure passage of the UCC project.197 Thus, the original Article 9 
was the creation of an interest-group-dominated process.198 
 The business lawyers who served on the Article 9 study group revising 
Article 9 in the 1990’s had similar preferences concerning the regulation of 
commercial practice. The study group was comprised of two academic 
reporters and sixteen members—three legal academics and thirteen 
practicing lawyers, the largest number of whom were in-house counsel for 
banks and �inance companies or private attorneys representing secured 
�inancing interests.199 The Study Group revising Article 9 de�ined its task as 
the resolution of “technical” problems that were susceptible to legal 
expertise, rather than the undertaking of possibly controversial reform.200 
The privileged status of hands-on working knowledge of Article 9 rules thus 
gave the in-house counsel and the private commercial lawyers the power to 
determine the course of the revision. Efforts by the academic members to 
place signi�icant reform proposals on the agenda were uniformly 
                                                                                                                                                    
 196. See Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 1962 U. ILL. L. F., 321, 323–24 (1962) (describing how pushback from �inance companies 
ultimately lead to “one of the weakest compromises in the Code”). 
 197. See id. at 322, 326–27. 
The determined opposition of well-knit groups tends to induce the 
legislature to do nothing, which is a victory for the opposition. The Code 
would have been a sitting duck target for any determined special interest 
or combination of special interests who chose to attack one or more 
features of the bill persistently. Thus, it was important not to arouse the 
opposition of banks or �inance companies . . . . 
 198. Donald Rapson, then Vice President and Assistant General Counsel of the CIT Group, 
Inc., and a participant in the Article 9 revision process, provides further evidence of the role 
of interest groups at the level of the study group. In describing the general UCC revision 
process, he says: 
The question, however, is whether the “environment” of the drafting 
committee process inhibits drafting fair and ef�icient statutory rules that 
advance the public interest. . . . I fear that the process makes that very 
dif�icult to do. . . . Although the individual members of the drafting 
committee are supposed . . . to vote their own consciences independently 
of their personal af�iliations, the fact remains that their statements and 
votes are publicly made in the glare of the interest groups. Drafting 
committee members whose practice, employment, or academic 
consulting is for or on behalf of an interest group may be hard pressed to 
take an action contrary to that group. 
Donald J. Rapson, Who is Looking Out for the Public Interest? Thoughts About the UCC Revision 
Process in the Light (And Shadows) of Professor Rubin’s Observations, 28 LOY. LA. L. REV. 249, 
260–61 (1994). 
 199. See Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783, 1807–08 (1994). 
 200. See id. at 1805–09. 
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unsuccessful.201 Thereafter, the 1999 revisions to Article 9 were adopted in 
all 50 states. 
2. Revising Articles 3 and 4: “Bankers’ Legislation” 
The same in�luences that affected the creation and revision of Article 9 
affected Articles 3 and 4. These Articles affect banks—but no other cohesive 
interest group—and bank lawyers played a large role in the original drafting 
process. These lawyers’ preferences also were close to those of the business 
lawyers in the ULC and the ALI. Because the political situation had not 
changed since the original UCC, it is unsurprising that the recently revised 
Articles 3 and 4 would resemble the original rules in relevant respects. The 
consensus view of participants in the revisions to Articles 3 and 4 was that 
the successful efforts to revise Articles 3 and 4 produced “bankers’ 
legislation.”202 
These reports from participants in the Article 3 and 4 revision process 
are consistent with the observation that these study groups were industry 
dominated.203 Both revisions passed the ALI and ULC, and both have been 
enacted into law in every state except New York. The new proposals are 
compatible with industry interests, but whether they serve the interests of 
other constituencies is hard to determine a priori. It is clear that Articles 3 
and 4 are widely thought to be industry products, but that does not answer 
the question of whether the revisions are also in the public interest. There 
are, however, good reasons to believe that they are not.204 
                                                                                                                                                    
 201. Id. at 1807–09. 
 202. This history is described in Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a 
Lobbyist: Some Notes on the Process of Revising Articles 3 and 4, 26 LOY. LA. L. REV. 743, 744–48 
(1993), and in Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Law 
Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83, 101–10 (1993). 
 203. See Rubin, supra note 197, at 746, 788 (detailing industry in�luence during the 
deliberations of the ABA committee reviewing the revisions to Articles 3 and 4). 
 204. See Rubin, supra note 197, at 750–52 (detailing how the committee withdrew a 
proposed consumer-friendly revision to the stop payment provision based on empirically 
unproven assumptions that many consumers who stop checks do so dishonestly, that banks 
already offer suf�icient protection to consumers, and that the revision would strip banks of 
�lexibility); id. at 754–57 (discussing how the committee favored rapid truncation, which 
reduced transaction costs for banks, but decreased information for customers seeking to 
detect bank errors or fraud); id. at 757–58 (discussing how the committee refused to approve 
a provision giving banks an extra day to process checks which would save customers 
substantial bounced-check fees). Patchel succinctly summed up the revisions as follows: 
[T]he revised Articles 3 and 4 are even more pro-bank than were their 
predecessors. Not only do they lack “af�irmative” consumer protection 
provisions, like disclosure requirements and bank services pricing 
controls, but in the course of resolving the con�licting interpretations of 
certain provisions, the interpretation favorable to the banks is almost 
always chosen, and, in the course of accommodating the Code to 
technological advances in the bank collection process, little regard is 
given to the impact of this accommodation on bank customers. 
Patchel, supra note 197, at 110. 
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The many successful revisions to the specialized commercial statutes 
in the UCC demonstrate that particular industries have been effective in 
creating, and preserving, law when the costs fall on diffuse groups. Banks 
and asset-backed lenders secured the adoption of UCC Articles 3, 4, and 9. 
These agents have secured updates that create gains for them and have 
prevented amendments that would reduce those gains. To the extent that 
there is a public interest independent of the �inancers’ interest, it has not 
been represented in the creation of these current statutes. 
D. The Many Faces of the Common Law 
That lawyers engage contract law within a specialized commercial 
practice (albeit in different ways) offers a fresh perspective on the 
operation of contract law in these nominally specialized �ields. M&A, 
bankruptcy, and �inancial transactions are areas of law that courts create 
under statutes that authorize actions but do not direct results. Thus, there 
is today a common law in each of these sub-�ields—and indeed the M&A 
experience generalizes. The Delaware Corporate Code is a set of enabling 
provisions and standards. Delaware corporate law, which largely is 
American corporate law, thus is the creation of the Delaware Chancery and 
the other Delaware courts. It is a commonplace that the common law of 
contracts has been superseded by more speci�ic bodies of law. But if the 
common law is de�ined by the mechanism that produces the rules, there is, in 
fact, a general common law of contract much of which travels under the 
names corporate law, bankruptcy law, M&A law, and the law of banking and 
�inance. And because today Article 2 of the UCC is obsolete, there is also a 
common law of sales. Unlike the original common law, however, these new 
common laws are created subject to the constraint that the new rules must 
be consistent with (and do not explicitly contradict) the linguistically 
applicable, but obsolete, nondirective statutes. This constraint is an 
impediment to the full creation of currently ef�icient defaults. In addition, as 
with obsolescence generally, parties may strategically exploit a linguistic �it 
to create private bene�its. 
There is a lesson we believe in the comparative institutional analysis 
that our project has begun. The Uniform Sales Act, created in 1906, was the 
�irst effort to codify a large portion of American contract law.205 Since then, 
the U.S. has passed statutes and created restatements the goals of which 
were to create current, ef�icient, and fair defaults and quasi-mandatory 
rules for contract and commercial law generally. These efforts have largely 
failed. A few industry and trade groups have created privately ef�icient 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
 205. The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, approved in 1896, was the �irst uniform 
commercial law promulgated by the ULC and it subsequently was enacted in every state. 
The Uniform Sales Act and Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act followed in 1906, 
the Uniform Bills of Lading Act and Uniform Stock Transfer Act in 1909, and 
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act in 1918. 
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contract rules and the organized bar and a few industries have spearheaded 
the enactment of specialized statutes that sometimes are privately ef�icient 
though not necessarily socially ef�icient. The private interests have either 
blocked further legislative change or produced change that furthers only 
their own interests. The putatively obsolete institution that more than a 
century of statutory and private legislative interventions have sought to 
supersede—the common law court—remains the only institution whose 
structure continues to generate current, ef�icient, and sometimes fair 
defaults.206 
It is noteworthy that as the technological revolution has ushered in 
signi�icant changes in commercial practice and contract design, only the 
common law courts have responded with new and apt default rules to 
address the contracting problems presented by new forms of contracting. 
As one example, the common law historically had great dif�iculty with 
preliminary agreements that expressed a mutual commitment on agreed 
terms and a commitment to negotiate further over the remaining terms. 
These “agreements to agree’’ confronted the inde�initeness doctrine head 
on. Until recently, courts consistently held that agreements to agree were 
unenforceable so long as an essential term was open to further 
negotiation.207 But today a new default rule is emerging. The contemporary 
framework for determining intent in agreements to agree was �irst 
proposed by Judge Pierre Leval in Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass’n of 
America v. Tribune Co.208 The Leval framework is now followed in at least 
thirteen states, sixteen federal district courts, and seven federal circuits.209 
The framework sets out a new default rule for cases in which the parties 
contemplated further negotiations. This rule requires the parties to 
negotiate in good faith over remaining terms and thus relaxes the knife-
                                                                                                                                                    
      
         206.  The common law court's opportunity to create defaults is sometimes thought to 
have been reduced by the growth of arbitration which removes cases that courts could have 
used to create rules.  This view has two dif�iculties.  First, courts do see many contract cases 
today.  Whether this number is suf�icient to create the optimal number of good defaults is 
impossible to know without a theory of the relation between the size of the set of cases for a 
commercial area and the ability of courts to create rules for parties who function in that area.  
Second, parties use arbitrators not because they are expert at creating rules but because they 
are expert at inferring a dyad's contractual intentions from the performance the promisor 
tendered and expert at evaluating the evidence of whether a performance was compliant. The 
growth in arbitration thus should not affect the courts' ability to create rules. For discussion, 
see Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, Conceptualizing Contractual Interpretation, 42 J. Leg. Stud. 
1 and Appendix B (2013)..  
 207. ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY, 30–42 (5th ed. 2013) 
(presenting and analyzing cases in which courts struck down agreements to agree for being 
too inde�inite). 
 208. 670 F. Supp. 491 (1987). 
 209. Schwartz & Scott, Preliminary Agreements, supra note 46, at 664. 
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edge character of the common law under which agreements were either 
fully enforceable or not enforceable at all.210  
A new common law default rule is also emerging to answer the 
question whether new forms of collaborative agreements that respond to 
the growing uncertainties in commercial practice are legally enforceable. 
These new arrangements are explicit, formal agreements between separate 
�irms that rely on collaboration and co-design to stimulate continuous 
improvement in product development and engineering.211 The open-ended 
agreements to collaborate pose a unique challenge for contract design: 
What consequences follow if one of the parties behaves strategically and 
attempts to appropriate for itself the fruits of the collaborative efforts? In 
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Emisphere Technologies, Inc.212 and Medinol Ltd v. Boston 
Scienti�ic Corp.,213 the courts found a breach of a commitment to collaborate 
and rejected the claim that these novel agreements were too inde�inite to be 
legally enforceable. Thus, even though these collaborative agreements are 
“radically incomplete,” the emerging default rule is that the formal written 
agreement is legally enforceable, thereby justifying an appropriate 
sanction.214 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The question posed today is the same question the American bar posed 
at the beginning of the twentieth century: Can the state create institutions 
that are better than the common law court at producing general contract 
law rules? The answer, so far, is no. To date, the production problem in 
contract law remains intractable. The failures of the ALI and ULC seem 
irremediable. These institutions have been unable, after over �ive decades 
of trying, to create a current, ef�icient contract law. And because the reasons 
for failure are the necessary product of the groups’ membership and 
structure, there is little hope for change. Moreover, the splintering of what 
once was the province of contract law generally into specialized common 
laws seems inevitable and highly likely to continue. From the perspective of 
the affected commercial parties, these specialized common laws are a great 
improvement over the classic common law. The mechanism that makes the 
common law ef�icient—that parties accept apt and reject inapt defaults—
also makes the specialized laws ef�icient; and the specialized laws add the 
virtue of expertise to the creation of defaults and quasi-mandatory rules. 
The policy concern that the specialized contract laws raise is that they are 
privately created and take only private gains into account. 
                                                                                                                                                    
 210. For discussion of the Leval framework, see generally id. 
 211. See supra text accompanying notes 47 to 51. 
 212. 408 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D. Ind. 2006). 
 213. 346 F. Supp. 2d 575 (S.D.N.Y.2004). 
 214. For a discussion of these new forms of collaborative contracting, see generally Gilson, 
Sabel & Scott, Contracting for Innovation, supra note 48, and Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Braiding, 
supra note 49. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3788595
 THE INTRACTABLE PRODUCTION PROBLEM 67 
This failing suggests the need for an institutional response. We have 
seen how uniform contract law rules instantiate obsolete terms under 
circumstances in which subsequent revision is precluded. If updating is an 
essential element in maintaining current contract law rules, then it follows 
that nimble administrative agencies rather than legislative enactments 
(whether public or private) are the mode of state intervention best able to 
solve the production problem in contract law. An agency that reviews the 
specialized �ields to identify any externalities their outputs create, that 
requires industry agents to internalize them, and that creates new general 
defaults would much improve the ef�iciency and fairness of our business 
law. And indeed, there is some evidence that just such an institutional 
response is underway. The leading edge of change is in the �ield of �inancial 
contracting and regulation. 
Considerable authority to regulate the contract terms in consumer 
�inancial markets is currently embodied in the legislation creating the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and its authority to regulate 
“unfair, deceptive or abusive acts and practices.”215 As the preceding 
analysis suggests, the baseline for supplying current, ef�icient contract 
terms in �inancial markets requires a process that mimics the common law 
mechanism for developing apt default rules. A particularly salient example 
of just such a process is the recent action by the CFPB in issuing a model 
“plain language” form for residential real estate credit contracts.216 
Importantly, use of the model form is not mandatory for banks and other 
entities that extend credit to home buyers. Rather, the use of a model form 
provides a safe harbor for creditors or lessors.217 Thus, it is conceived as a 
                                                                                                                                                    
 215. Section 5531 of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau provides the CFPB with 
broad authority to prohibit “unfair, deceptive or abusive acts and practices.” 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5531(a) (2019). An of�icial report by the CFPB describes this project in the following terms: 
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau will aim to bring clarity to the 
marketplace. A fair, ef�icient, and transparent market depends upon 
consumers’ ability to compare the costs, bene�its, and risks of different 
products effectively and to use that information to choose the product 
that is best for them. Fine print and overly long agreements can make it 
dif�icult for consumers to understand and compare products, and that 
obstacle to sound markets is not removed by disclosures that are too 
complicated or that do not focus on the key information consumers need. 
The principal role of consumer protection regulation in credit markets is 
to make it easy for consumers to see what they are getting and to compare 
one product with another, so that markets can function effectively. 
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, BUILDING THE CFPB: A PROGRESS REPORT 10 (July 18, 2011). 
 216. See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 2013 INTEGRATED MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE 
RULE UNDER THE REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT (REGULATION X) AND THE TRUTH IN 
LENDING ACT (REGULATION Z), https://www.consumer�inance.gov/policy-
compliance/rulemaking/�inal-rules/2013-integrated-mortgage-disclosure-rule-under-real-
estate-settlement-procedures-act-regulation-x-and-truth-lending-act-regulation-z. 
 217. 15 U.S.C § 1604(b) (2012) provides: 
A creditor or lessor shall be deemed to be in compliance with the 
disclosure provisions of this subchapter with respect to other than 
numerical disclosures if the creditor or lessor (1) uses any appropriate 
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default from which the regulated entities may depart at their option. From 
the vantage point of the claim here—that standardized contract terms in 
large, interdependent consumer markets are inevitably obsolete—this safe 
harbor approach functions to eliminate obsolete terms in the course of 
formulating the model form. The objective, then, is to provide a 
continuously updated baseline of ef�icient contract terms against which 
existing practices can be measured. 218 
Highly specialized �inancial markets present a further opportunity to 
observe how administrative regulation and supervision has mitigated the 
externalities caused by privately created contract law. Regulators and 
supervisors in the banking and �inancial regulatory context routinely 
impose contractual requirements in many kinds of contracts. For example, 
regulatory and supervisory standardization of derivatives contracts was a 
major factor in mitigating the externality risks created by the unsupervised 
derivatives trading that brought on the 2008 �inancial crisis.219 Regulators 
are also engaging with commercial �inancing interests to update the 
obsolete terms in �inancial contracts.220 The London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR) is the prime example of an obsolete term in international interbank 
�inancial contracts. LIBOR is a benchmark interest rate at which major 
global banks lend to one another; it serves as a globally accepted benchmark 
that discloses borrowing costs between banks.221 LIBOR is used pervasively 
                                                                                                                                                    
model form or clause as published by the Bureau, or (2) uses any such 
model form or clause and changes it by (A) deleting any information 
which is not required by this subchapter, or (B) rearranging the format, if 
in making such deletion or rearranging the format, the creditor or lessor 
does not affect the substance, clarity, or meaningful sequence of the 
disclosure. 
 218. To be sure, there is always the risk of agency capture in any regulatory initiative. 
This risk is particularly acute when the universal practice of mandatory arbitration clauses 
prevents judicial review of terms that fail to conform to the baseline. 
 219. Section 804 of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
provides the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) the authority to designate a 
�inancial market utility (FMU) that it determines is, or is likely to become, systemically 
important. 12 U.S.C § 5463 (2010). FMUs are “multilateral systems that provide the 
infrastructure for transferring, clearing, and settling payments, securities, and other �inancial 
transactions among �inancial institutions or between �inancial institutions and the system.” 
Designated Financial Market Utilities, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RSRV. SYS., 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/designated_fmu_about.htm (last updated 
Jan. 29, 2015). The FSOC has currently designated eight FMUs as systematically important 
because “a failure of or a disruption to the[ir] functioning . . . could . . . threaten the stability of 
the U. S. �inancial system.” Id. Whether this regulatory effort adequately represents the public 
interest remains an open question. Some academic commentators believe that FSOC’s federal 
regulators are unduly in�luenced by private banking interests. See, e.g., Saul T. Omarova, 
Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Towards Tripartism in Financial Services Regulation, 37 
J. CORP. L. 621, 629–32 (2012) (explaining how regulators of the �inancial services sector are 
particularly susceptible to regulatory capture). 
 220. We are grateful to Kate Judge for pointing us to this example. 
 221. LIBOR rates still serve as benchmarks for trillions of dollars in securities across the 
globe. LIBOR serves as a reference rate for many bond investments, like �loating-rate notes, 
bank loans and some preferred securities. It still serves as a benchmark for many consumer 
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and yet is structurally unsound and no longer usable beyond 2021.222 In 
2014, the Federal Reserve Board and the New York Federal Reserve Bank 
jointly convened a group of banks to form the Alternative Reference Rates 
Committee (ARRC) to �irst propose an alternative and then to encourage 
migration to the new interest benchmark.223 In 2017, the ARRC identi�ied a 
market-based index, the Secured Overnight Financing Rate, as the rate that 
represents best practice for use in new derivatives and other �inancial 
contracts. Since then, the ARRC has continued addressing risks in contract 
language in �inancial products. Their recommendations include draft 
contract language to be voluntarily incorporated in new contracts that 
reference LIBOR to ensure these contracts will continue to be effective in 
the event that LIBOR is no longer usable.224 The ARRC thus mimics the 
common law mechanism in attempting to produce updated terms that track 
changing commercial patterns. 
 As we noted earlier, in some specialized markets the parties 
themselves can coordinate on current, ef�icient contract terms. But in 
others, as with the ARRC, the state can serve as the partner in facilitating the 
coordination needed to update obsolete terms. The experience gained by 
observing the updating of these �inancial contracts suggests that a similar 
public/private regulatory response is the most promising solution to the 
vexing production problem in contract law. Such a response should adopt 
the best features of the common law rule-making mechanism—it must 
produce rules that not only adapt to changing commercial practices, but that 
also take into account the public interest. The entities that we envisage 
would create two kinds of rules: mandatory rules that require parties to 
internalize externalities; and default rules for contracting problems whose 
solutions would affect only the parties. We leave to another day how such 
collaboration would function in other contexts and other markets, but we 
note that without one America’s contract law is limited to courts and private 
interests only. 
                                                                                                                                                    
loans as well, including margin loans, pledged-asset lines and variable-rate mortgages. See A 
Primer on LIBOR’s Phase Out and Transition, FED. HOME BANK LOAN OF ATLANTA (Nov. 11, 2018), 
http://corp.�hlbatl.com/resources/a-primer-on-libors-phase-out-and-transition. 
 222. LIBOR is based on daily submissions of estimated borrowing rates by a panel of 
banks. Due to changes in the �inancial markets, the regulator of LIBOR will no longer compel 
these banks to continue submissions beyond 2021. Id. 
 223. About the ARRC, ARRC, https://www.newyorkfed.org/arrc (last visited Oct. 14, 
2020). 
 224. Id. 
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